Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc.; Consolidated Realty Group; William K. Martin, Jr.; Herman L. Franks; and Charles L. Davis : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen
Cooperative, Inc.; Consolidated Realty Group;
William K. Martin, Jr.; Herman L. Franks; and
Charles L. Davis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark J. Williams; Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell; attorney for appellees.
Craig W. Anderson, Jay Stone; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen, No. 20000503.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/505
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, 
INC.; CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR.; HERMAN L. 
FRANKS; and CHARLES L. DAVIS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No.
 L1 5 
Case No. 20000503-SC 
t Lake Department, State of Utah Appeal from the Third District Court, Sa 
Honorable Judge Sheila McCleve presiding 
Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (#0078) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
JAY STONE (#3125) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Salt Lake County 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2655 
Mark J. Williams 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellees 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
?m 
C-llBK SUr<iEME C0l! 
UT*H 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate ) 






WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, 
INC.; CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; ) 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR.; HERMAN L. 
FRANKS; and CHARLES L. DAVIS, ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20000503-SC 
Defendants/Appellees. ) 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah 
Honorable Judge Sheila McCleve presiding 
Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (#0078) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
JAY STONE (#3125) 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Salt Lake County 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2655 
Mark J. Williams 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellees 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LIST OF PARTIES IN LOWER COURT 
PLAINTIFFS: Salt Lake Couinv. 
and politic of tb^ *<nne of T "IM^ 
DEFENDANTS: Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc., 
Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., 
Herman L, Franks, and 
Charles L. Davis 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES hi 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
A. Nature of the Case 5 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 6 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 14 
THE DENIAL OF THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE WAS UNREASONABLE BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT RELIED SOLELY ON 
CONSOLIDATED'S VERSION OF THE EVENTS 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying a 
Continuance 15 
B. The County was Not Dilatory in Pursuing Discovery 16 
C. The Information Sought was Relevant and in the Sole 
Possession of Consolidated 17 
•l-
TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONTINUED 
D. The County's Complaint was Sufficient to Give Notice of Its 
Claim 20 
POINT II 21 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED BY 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS RAISED BY 
THE COUNTY AND UNCONTROVERTED BY 
CONSOLIDATED 
A. A Factual Dispute Exists Regarding the Contract Terms . . . . 22 
B. The Existence of a Contract is a Factual Issue 24 
C. The Duties Under the Contract Involved Disputed Facts . . . . 26 
D. The Breach of a Contract Duty is an Issue of Fact 28 
E. A Factual Dispute Exists Regarding the Conditions on the 
Property 30 
F. Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Conditions is a 
Factual Issue 33 
G. It is Inappropriate to Weigh the Evidence on Summary 
Judgment 35 
POINT III 38 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE THE 
BASIS FOR ITS RULING ON THE RULE 56(f) MOTION 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES: 
Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 4,39,40 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137,139 (Utah 1992) 4,41 
Coxv. Winters, 678P'.2d311 (Utah 1984) 18 
Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, Sll P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) 2 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). . . . 5,16 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, %%% P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) 36,37 
Easton v. Straussbuger, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383, 387 (Cal.App. 1 Dist 1984) 27 
Gaddv. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1984) 35,36 
Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Finan., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 
(N.M. App. 1984) 30 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 22 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp. 834 P.2d 556, 561 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992) 15 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1999). . 41 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 29 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 300 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 33 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 32 
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 5 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONTINUED 
Neiderhauser Bldrs. &Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) 3 
Price Development v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000) 2,3,19,20 
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 26,27,28,32,34 
Secorv. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986) 27 
State v.Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993) 2 
Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 
(Utah 1977) 17,18 
Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co. , 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3rd Cir. 1942) . 18 
W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) 37 
Wardley Corp. Better Homes & Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 22 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982) 20 
RULES: 
Rule Rl 62-6-1 Utah Administrative Code 5,28,34 
Rule Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.1(c) Utah Administrative Code 5,28 
Rule R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.2 Utah Administrative Code 5,28 
Rule 3 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 4 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 24(f) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONTINUED 
Rule 8(a)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 20 
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 
Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4,5,10,39 
Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1,4,5,11,14,38,41 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3,5,35 
Rule 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1,2,4,5,8,9,13,14,15,17,18,19,20,38,39,40,41,42 
Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0') 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 25 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) 26,40 
OTHER: 
Article VIII Constitution of the State of Utah 1 
-v-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to: 
1. Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; 
2. Section 78-2-2(3)0), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended; and 
3. Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
B. The action which forms the basis of this appeal was filed by Salt Lake County 
(the "County") in the Third District Court. The County filed its Complaint against 
multiple defendants: Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. ("WDCI"), Consolidated 
Realty Group, William K. Martin ("Martin"), Jr., Herman L. Franks ("Franks"), and 
Charles L. Davis ("Davis") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Consolidated"). The 
County appeals the trial court's May 9, 2000, Order which: denied the County's May 18, 
1999, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial, affirmed a Summary 
Judgment dismissing Consolidated, and denied the County's Rule 56(f) Motion for 
additional time to conduct discovery. The trial court certified, pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
that the summary judgment disposed of all claims against the Consolidated defendants. 
The County's claims against WDCI arising out of the same underlying transaction, remain 
in the District Court. WDCI has not asserted any cross-claims against Consolidated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The County raises the following issues on appeal: 
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A. Was the denial of the County's 56(f) Motion for Continuance reasonable under 
the circumstances? Did the trial court err by denying the County's Motion on the issue of 
whether Consolidated knew or should have known of the alleged latent defects? 
1. Preservation of Issue: 
a. Objection to Summary Judgment Dismissing Consolidated. (Record 
at 00331 to 00333). 
b. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial (Record at 
00341). 
c. Notice of Appeal (record at 00658). 
2. Standard of Review - abuse of discretion 
3. Authority 
a. Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
b. Price Development v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000) 
c. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) 
d. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) 
B. Was summary judgment precluded by the existence of genuine issues of 
material facts? Did the trial court err in granting Consolidated's Motion for Summary 
Judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) the existence of 
a contract imposing a fiduciary duty of care on Consolidated; (2) whether Consolidated 
met the higher contractual fiduciary duty of care; (3) whether Consolidated knew or 
should have known of the subsurface conditions under the circumstances alleged in the 
2 
Complaint; and (4) Consolidated's procedures in accepting a listing for commercial 
property and compliance with the Utah Department of Commerce licensing requirements 
for a Listing Agreement, independent of contractual or common law duties? 
1. Preservation of Issue: 
a. Objection to Summary Judgment Dismissing Consolidated. (Record 
at 00331 to 00333). 
b. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For New Trial. (Record at 
00341) 
c. Notice of Appeal (Record at 00658). 
2. Standard of Review - correctness 
a. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
b. The Appellate Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact 
issues. 
3. Authority 
a. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
b. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 
(Utah Ct.App. 1992) 
c. Price Development v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000) 
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C. Did the trial court err by not specifying the basis for the ruling on the 
alternative grounds relied on by Consolidated in its motion, and failing to state the reason 
for denying the County's Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time to conduct discovery as 
required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? Furthermore, the Order is 
not supported by findings of fact explaining the lack of factual overlap between the 
certified and remaining claims. 
1. Preservation of Issue: 
a. Objection to Summary Judgment Dismissing Consolidated. (Record 
at 00331 to 00333). 
b. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For New Trial. (Record at 
00341). 
c. Notice of Appeal (Record at 00658). 
2. Standard of Review - correctness and abuse of discretion 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
3. Authority 
a. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
b. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
c. Rule 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
d. Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 
(UtahCtApp. 1990) 
e. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d. 137, 139 (Utah 1992) 
f. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,278 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 
g. Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following authorities are determinative of the issues: 
1. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
2. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
3. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4. Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
5. Rule Rl 62-6-1 Utah Administrative Code 
6. Rule Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.1 (c) Utah Administrative Code 
7. Rule R162-6-2.6.2.16.3.2 Utah Administrative Code 
The contents of the cited authorities are fully set forth in the Addendum to this Brief 
in accordance with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action arising out of a Contract for the purchase of real property, and 
seeking to recover the costs to cure undisclosed subsurface conditions. The appeal is 
from the trial court's Order denying the County's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or 
for New Trial and the County's Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
This appeal presents a number of unusual procedural issues due to the early 
rulings and course of proceedings in the trial court. 
1. The County filed a Complaint in the Third District Court on or about June 
26,1998, alleging two causes of action against Consolidated: (1) breach of duty of 
reasonable care; and (2) breach of duty to disclose. (Record at 00001 to 00034). Both 
duties arose out of a Contract for the purchase of real property, which included an 
"Agency Disclosure Agreement" providing in pertinent part: 
Duties of Seller's Agent: 
A Seller's agent or a subagent of that agent has the following 
affirmative obligations: (To the Seller) A fiduciary duty of 
utmost care, integrity, honesty and loyalty in dealings with the 
Seller. (To the Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skills, and diligence in performance of the 
agent's duties; (b) A duty of honesty and fair dealing with 
good faith; (c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent 
which materially affect the property that are not known to, or 
within the diligent attention and observation of, the parties. 
(Emphasis added) (Record at 00026). 
Duties of Buyer's Agent: 
An agent acting only for the Buyer has the following 
affirmative obligations: (To the Buyer) (a) A fiduciary duty of 
utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings with 
the Seller. (To the Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to 
exercise reasonable care skills and diligence in performance 
of the agent's duties; (b) A duty of honesty and fair dealing 
with good faith; (c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the 
agent which materially affect the value of property that are 
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not known to or within the diligent attention and observation 
of the parties. (Emphasis added) (Record at 00026) 
Duties of Agent Representing Both Buyer and Seller: 
A real estate agent, either acting directly or through one or 
more associate licensees, may legally be the agent of both the 
seller and the buyer in a transaction, but only with the 
knowledge and consent of both the seller and the buyer. In a 
dual agency situation, the agent has the following affirmative 
obligations to both the seller and the buyer: (a) a fiduciary 
duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in 
dealings with the seller and the buyer; (b) other duties to the 
seller and the buyer as stated above in their respective 
sections. (Emphasis added). (Record at 00026). 
2. Consolidated filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on August 28, 1998. (Record at 00073). The motion was 
made on the grounds that: (1) "under the applicable Utah case law", a real estate agent 
has no duty to disclose latent defects of which he has no knowledge; and (2) Plaintiffs 
action is a tort claim barred by the "applicable statute of limitations". (Record at 00073 to 
00074). Three affidavits were submitted in support of the motion and it was treated as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Record at 00095 to 00103). Because the Motion was granted, Consolidated never filed 
an answer to the Complaint. 
3. The County subsequently filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Consolidated5s Motion to Dismiss (Record at 00104 to 00126), together with two 
opposing affidavits (Record at 00153 to 00179), on September 21, 1998, and 
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simultaneously filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance (Record at 00136), together 
with a supporting affidavit (Record at 00147), requesting additional time to conduct 
discovery on the points raised in Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss. The Rule 56(f) 
Motion for additional time to conduct discovery was filed within twenty-four days of 
Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss. The Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance and 
supporting affidavit1 established there was insufficient time since the inception of the 
lawsuit to initiate discovery against the Consolidated defendants. (Record at 00147). 
4. Interrogatories and requests for production of documents were 
subsequently propounded to Consolidated but the answers to the interrogatories and 
documents were not received until January 11, 1999. (Record at 00242). The County did 
not have an opportunity to depose the real estate agents and their broker, however, 
because they were dismissed following the hearing on February 19, 1999. 
5. Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, together 
with the County's Rule 56(f) Motion, was heard by the trial court on February 19, 1999. 
(Record at 00244 to 00250 and 00664). 
6. The trial court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision dated March 
10, 1999, denying the County's Rule 56(f) Motion and granting Consolidated's Motion to 
1
 The affidavit of Patrick F. Holden in support of the Rule 56(f) Motion stated that 
although Consolidated had provided some preliminary information, the County needed additional 
time to conduct discovery as to the extent and limit of the Defendants "knowledge". In addition, 
discovery was necessary to discover relevant facts, including Consolidated's business practices 
when accepting a listing. (Record at 00147). 
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Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. (Record at 00264). 
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared and submitted by 
Consolidated's counsel on or about March 19, 1999. (Record at 00300 to 00308). The 
County objected to the proposed Findings and Conclusions on March 29, 1999. (Record 
at 00265 to 00276). Revised Findings and Conclusions were again submitted by 
Consolidated's counsel, followed by the County's Objections on April 13, 1999. (Record 
at 00320 to 00329). 
8. The pleadings were submitted for decision and the Memorandum 
Decision was followed by an Order signed by the trial court, on May 10, 1999. (Record at 
00334). This Order was not supported by final Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. 
The Order simply states that summary judgment was granted on the grounds and for the 
reasons that the County's action was barred " . . . by the applicable statute of limitations 
and, under Utah law, real estate agents have no duty to disclose latent defects on property 
in the absence of any knowledge of said defects." The order further states, ". . .plaintiffs 
Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time to conduct discovery is denied." (Record at 00335). 
9. On May 18, 1999, the County filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
or for New Trial pursuant to Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Record at 00342). In that motion, the County objected because the trial court failed to 
designate the basis for its rulings on the Rule 56(f) Motion and the ruling on the County's 
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contract claim, as required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
Furthermore, the County asserted that summary judgment was precluded by the existence 
of material facts on the contract and the issue of Consolidated's actual or constructive 
knowledge regarding the alleged undisclosed subsurface conditions. 
10. The County also filed a Motion to Amend Complaint on September 30, 
1999, to eliminate any ambiguity and clarify that the causes of action alleged against 
Consolidated arose out of contract and not tort. (Record at 00425). 
11. The County's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial was 
heard by Judge McCleve on December 10, 1999. (Record at 00638). 
12. The County's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted by Judge 
Nehring3 following a hearing on April 18, 2000. The Order granting the Motion was 
entered on May 4, 2000. (Record at 00642). To date, neither Consolidated nor WDCI 
have filed a response to the County's Amended Complaint. 
13. The trial court entered an Order dated May 8, 2000, denying the County's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial and affirming the May 10, 1999, 
ruling on Summary Judgment. (Record at 00645). In addition, the trial court determined 
2
 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted by Consolidated on 
March 19, 1999. (Record at 00300). The County objected to the Findings and Conclusions 
(Record at 00265) but the Court subsequently entered judgment without Findings and 
Conclusions. 
3
 This case was originally assigned to Judge McCleve. The case was later transferred to 
Judge Nehring in July, 1999, based on the reassignment of civil and criminal matters in the Third 
District Court. 
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that the Summary Judgment disposed of all claims against the Consolidated Defendants 
and certified the Order as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The County's Notice appealing the May 8, 2000, Order was subsequently 
filed on May 30, 2000. (Record at 00658). 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
WDCI owned a 5.06 acre parcel of real property located at approximately 800 
East 5300 South in Murray City, Utah. WDCI and its predecessors used the property as a 
milk processing plant and office until July, 1986, when WDCI ceased operations at the 
site. During the time the facility was in operation, the property contained several 
buildings, parking areas and underground storage tanks. Sometime in 1992, WDCI 
caused the "partial demolition" of the buildings on the property and covered the 
remaining concrete footings, slabs, demolition debris and other material with gravel and 
dirt. (Record at 00003 and 00004). 
In 1993, WDCI placed the property on the market and retained Consolidated as 
its broker and agent for the sale of the property. In June, 1993, Salt Lake County began 
looking for land on which to build a new building for the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department's Division of Environmental Health. The County considered the WDCI 
property among other sites. At the time the County considered the purchase of the 
property, it appeared to be a vacant lot, covered with dirt, gravel and weeds. In the fall of 
1993, Salt Lake County negotiated with WDCI through Consolidated for the purchase of 
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the property. Charles L. Davis, a real estate agent with Consolidated, represented the 
County as the buyer in the transaction. Herman L. Franks, a real estate agent also with 
Consolidated, represented WDCI as the seller in the transaction. Both Davis and Franks 
were agents of Consolidated5s principal broker, William K. Martin, throughout the course 
of the transaction. (Record at 00004 and 00005). 
On December 24, 1993, WDCI and the County entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract for the purchase of the property.4 The transaction was closed on April 
25, 1994. At no time prior to the closing, did WDCI, Consolidated, Davis, Martin or 
Franks inform the County that concrete footings, slabs, rebar and other demolition debris 
remained below the surface of the property. (Record at 00005 to 00007). 
In June, 1997, the County began construction and encountered subsurface 
conditions including: concrete footings, vaults, slabs, rebar and other demolition debris. 
The new building could not be constructed until the old concrete was exposed, broken up 
and hauled away. The County subsequently incurred costs for removing the subsurface 
concrete, backfilling, compaction, and incurred construction delays and other related costs 
for the undisclosed subsurface conditions totaling in excess of $444,000.00. (Record at 
00007 to 00009). 
4
 The Contract included an "agency disclosure agreement" signed by Charles Davis on 
behalf of Consolidated Real Group, specifying Consolidated's duties under the dual agency 
relationship. (Record at 00026). 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The denial of the County's Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance to conduct discovery 
was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The County was not dilatory in pursuing 
discovery because Consolidated moved to dismiss rather than answer the Complaint. The 
affidavit in support of the motion adequately described the need for discovery of relevant 
facts. The information sought regarding the "knowledge" of the real estate agents and 
business practices of the broker, was in the sole possession of the real estate sales agents, 
broker and Consolidated as a corporate entity. The trial court's Orders denying the 
County's Motion failed to explain why the County was not given sufficient time to 
conduct discovery against the real estate agents, broker and Consolidated. 
POINT II 
Summary Judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material facts. The 
unresolved and disputed material factual issues include: (1) the existence of a Contract 
among the parties; (2) the imposition of additional fiduciary duties under the Contract; (3) 
whether Consolidated met the contractual fiduciary duties; (4) the conditions on the 
property; and (5) Consolidated's actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions. It 
was inappropriate for the trial court to weigh the evidence submitted by affidavits and 
exhibits. The sole inquiry in the trial court should have been whether genuine issues of 
material fact existed. 
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POINT III 
The trial court failed to articulate the basis for its ruling denying the County's Rule 
56(f) Motion and granting the Rule 54(b) Certification. The trial court failed to state the 
grounds for the ruling on Consolidated's alternative grounds for summary judgment. 
Furthermore, no basis whatsoever was given for denying the County's motion for 
additional time to conduct discovery which was filed only twenty-four days after 
Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss. Finally, the trial court failed to enter findings 
explaining the lack of a factual overlap between the certified claims and claims remaining 
below against WDCI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE WAS UNREASONABLE BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED SOLELY ON 
CONSOLIDATED'S VERSION OF THE EVENTS 
Both the trial court's May 10, 1999, Order granting Consolidated's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record at 00335) and May 8, 2000, Order denying the County's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial (Record at 00645), merely state 
that: "Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery is 
denied." Neither Order explains why the County was not given an opportunity to conduct 
discovery against the Consolidated defendants. 
The County filed its Complaint in the Third District Court on June 26, 1998. (Record 
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at 00001). Sixty-three (63) days later, on August 28,1998, Consolidated filed its Motion 
to Dismiss rather than answering the Complaint. (Record at 00073). The County's Rule 
56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery was filed only twenty-four (24) 
days after Consolidated's Motion, on September 21, 1998. (Record at 00136). 
Simply stated, this appeal involves a matter of fundamental fairness. Was it fair for 
the trial court to dismiss Consolidated based solely on affidavits stating the real estate 
agents and broker "did not know and had no reason to believe" in the existence of 
undisclosed conditions on the property? As it stands, the trial court's ruling on the 
County's claims was based solely on Consolidated's version of the events. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying a Continuance 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such order as is just. 
The law regarding a Rule 56(f) motion is well-settled in Utah. The Utah Court 
of Appeals stated that Rule 56(f) "gives the trial court discretion to determine whether the 
reasons stated in the affidavit are adequate for the court to grant a motion." Jones v. 
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Utah courts consider three factors in assessing a Rule 56(f) motion: 
1. Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is 
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the party against whom summary judgment is sought merely on a "fishing expedition" for 
purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been conducted without producing 
any significant evidence? 
2. Was there sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for the party 
against whom summary judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby 
cross-examine the moving party? 
3. If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
B. The County was Not Dilatory in Pursuing Discovery 
The chronology of events following the filing of the Complaint establishes that 
the County was not dilatory in pursuing discovery. The request for additional time for 
discovery had merit because the issue was not simply whether the Consolidated 
defendants "knew" of the concealed subsurface conditions, but whether they had a 
fiduciary duty to inquire regarding the suitability of the property for the intended use. 
Consolidated failed to address the fiduciary duties of Mr. Davis, the buyer's agent, in 
representing the interests of its client, Salt Lake County, in the transaction. Particularly, 
whether Mr. Davis should have recommended that the County undertake a further 
inspection of the property or include specific contract terms to address the potential for 
latent conditions. 
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Consolidated maintained a dual fiduciary relationship with Salt Lake County 
and WDCI. (Record at 00022, See, Paragraph 5). The County was entitled to examine the 
defendants under oath, as trained real estate professionals, to determine the extent of their 
knowledge and to test their assertions that they lacked any knowledge of the subsurface 
conditions. In this regard, Mr. Franks relationship as the seller's agent raised an inference 
of knowledge or reason to know sufficient to warrant further discovery. 
C. The Information Sought was Relevant and in the Sole Possession of 
Consolidated 
In denying the Rule 56(f) motion, the trial court also failed to address the fact 
that the information sought by the County was in the sole possession of Consolidated, its 
real estate agents and broker. In Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 
P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977), this Court reversed a trial court's refusal to allow discovery 
under Rule 56(f). The Court stated: 
The matters recited therein concerned knowledge in the 
possession and control of defendant; there had not been 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for plaintiff 
to utilize discovery procedures, and thereby have an 
opportunity to cross-examine the moving party. The 
pleadings had not been closed, and there were complex legal 
issues posed, with an inadequate factual basis. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Supreme Court, in Strand, cited the following illustrative federal decision: 
. . .The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings 
as to this cause of action in order to afford the plaintiff an 
opportunity to produce evidence of the facts necessary to 
support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that this 
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evidence must come largely from the defendants. This case 
illustrates the danger of founding a judgment in favor of 
one party upon his version of the facts within his sole 
knowledge as set forth in the affidavits prepared ex parte. 
Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable 
examination of his records by the other party frequently 
bring forth further facts which place a very different light 
upon the picture. The plaintiff should, therefore, be given a 
reasonable opportunity, under proper safeguards, to take the 
depositions and have the discovery which they seek.... 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. (citing Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3rd Cir. 
1942). 
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), this Court reasoned, based on 
federal case law, that: 
. . .the party opposing summary judgment filed an affidavit 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) seeking further discovery in order to 
"flush out evidence" to support his claim. The court held that 
Rule 56(f) motions should be granted liberally and inasmuch 
as an adequate opportunity for discovery had not been 
provided, the motion for summary judgment should be 
adjourned pending the completion of such discovery. 
Consolidated, in effect, persuaded the trial court to enter a "judgment in favor 
of one party upon his version of the facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in the 
affidavits prepared ex parte." Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 
P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977). 
The affidavit of Patrick Holden, submitted in support of the Rule 56(f) Motion 
to Continue, explained why the County needed time to conduct discovery. Specifically, 
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the affidavit states that discovery was necessary to test the assertions of the Consolidated 
defendants that they lacked any knowledge, and to ascertain Consolidated's business 
practices in representing buyers and sellers of real estate. (Record at 00180). The 
affidavit also refers to the need to pursue discovery regarding matters raised by defendant 
WDCI in its Answer about the conditions existing on the Property. Clearly, the facts the 
County sought additional time to discover were relevant to the issue of knowledge. 
(Record at 00182). 
Pending the hearing on Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss, the County 
submitted interrogatories and requests for production of documents to Consolidated. 
Consolidated did not respond to the discovery requests until January 11, 1999, just prior 
to the February 19, 1999, hearing on Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at 
00250). The County was effectively precluded from deposing the real estate agents and 
broker under oath, however, because they were dismissed as parties following the 
hearing. 
In Price Development v. Orem City, 995 P.Id 1237 (Utah 2000), this Court 
reviewed a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) Motion. The facts in that case involved a 
complex multi-party, multi-year commercial transaction including government 
development incentives. The case was not a simple transaction which the trial court 
could resolve as a matter of law based on documentary evidence. On appeal, this Court 
evaluated the affidavit submitted in support of the Rule 56(f) motion for more discovery. 
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The affidavit stated that additional discovery was necessary in order to determine whether 
the transaction was supported by adequate consideration, in the form of economic 
development. This Court ruled the trial court abused its discretion under the 
circumstances when it found that the only issues to be decided were matters of law. This 
court concluded that trial courts should liberally grant Rule 56(f) motions to provide an 
adequate opportunity for discovery, unless the motions are "dilatory or lacking merit". 
The facts in the case at hand involve a commercial real estate transaction which 
was subject to a variety of contingencies. (Record at 00024). Like the Price case, the 
allegations made against Consolidated could not be resolved based on a review of the 
documentary evidence as a matter of law. The County's Motion was not interposed for 
delay and the supporting affidavit articulated an investigation of facts relevant to the issue 
of knowledge, justifying the need for discovery. 
D. The County's Complaint was Sufficient to Give Notice of Its Claims 
Utah has adopted liberal pleading requirements. Rule 8(a)(1) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires only that a pleading set forth "a short plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...". The application of this rule was 
described in Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982) as follows: 
. . .The fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is 
to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to 
the requirement that their adversary have fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved. The functions of issue-formulation 
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and fact revelation are appropriately left to the deposition-
discovery process— 
Due to the early stage in the development of the case at the time of 
Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss and the liberal requirements of notice pleadings, the 
County should have been given an opportunity to test the factual basis of the affidavits 
and to develop its case against Consolidated through discovery. The notice requirements 
of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a litigant to prove its case at the time of 
filing its complaint. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED BY 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS RAISED BY 
THE COUNTY AND UNCONTROVERTED BY 
CONSOLIDATED 
The sole question raised in the trial court by Consolidated's Motion was the 
existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. The County's Seventh Cause of 
Action alleged that Consolidated failed to properly exercise its contractual fiduciary 
duties. The County alleged that Consolidated failed to ask WDCI to provide a full and 
honest disclosure of the subsurface conditions. The County also alleged that as 
professionals licensed by the state, the real estate agents and broker failed to recommend 
the inclusion of certain contractual provisions, or to advise the County to conduct a more 
specific investigation of WDCI's representations regarding the Property. Consolidated 
did not controvert these allegations in the affidavits submitted to the trial court. 
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Accordingly, Consolidated failed to show any entitlement to summary judgment with 
respect to the Seventh Cause of Action. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wardley Corp. Better 
Homes & Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Further, the court 
should "view the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1993). 
A. A Factual Dispute Exists Regarding the Contract Terms 
Consolidated maintains that it did not know and had no reason to believe in the 
existence of the subsurface conditions described in the Complaint. The County alleges, 
however, that a fiduciary duty of care exceeding the common law standard was imposed 
on Consolidated under the Agency Disclosure Agreement attached to the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Contract"). (Record at 
00026, Exhibit "B"). The general allegations articulated in the Complaint regarding the 
contract obligations (Record at 00006 and 00007, paragraphs 26 to 33) are specifically 
incorporated by reference in the Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action against 
Consolidated. (Record at 00016 and 00018). 
The County's Seventh Cause of Action is premised on Consolidated5s failure to 
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properly exercise its contractual fiduciary duties. Paragraph 96 of County's Complaint 
reads: 
Consolidated, Martin, Franks and Davis breached their duty 
of reasonable care owed to the County by: (a) failing to 
include, or recommend inclusion, of a contract provision 
warranting that the Property was free from subsurface 
conditions that would materially [sic] effect the value or use 
of the Property resulting from the prior demolition of 
buildings on the site; (b) failing to ask WDCI to provide a full 
and honest disclosure of the subsurface conditions; (c) failing 
to advise the County to specifically investigate and verify 
whether WDCI had fixlly demolished all of the buildings and 
whether to undertake a further investigation notwithstanding 
the County's investigation stated herein; and (d) otherwise 
failing to discover and disclose the existence of the subsurface 
conditions. (Record at 00017). 
Consolidated had a contractual fiduciary duty to exercise the "utmost" care on 
behalf of the County. (Record at 00111, "Duties of Seller's Agent" Disclosure 
Agreement). Consolidated's assertion that it did not "know" of the subsurface conditions 
was irrelevant to its breach of the separate and distinct contractual fiduciary duty to 
exercise the "utmost" care. 
The County's Memorandum in Opposition to Consolidated's Motion to 
Dismiss contained a statement of Disputed Material Facts and a statement of 
Supplemental Material Facts. (Record at 00106 and 00109). The County's Memorandum 
was also supported by two affidavits which directly challenged the self-serving statements 
made by defendants Martin, Franks and Davis in their affidavits in support of 
Consolidated's motion. (Record at 00153 and 00173). Summary judgment was, therefore, 
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precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material facts regarding the more 
stringent fiduciary duties. 
B. The Existence of a Contract is a Factual Issue 
The Contract5 documents are specifically referred to in the affidavit of Mr. Lee 
Colvin submitted by the County in opposition to Consolidated5s Motion to Dismiss. In 
paragraph 13 of his affidavit, Mr. Colvin states that Consolidated attached the Agency 
Disclosure Agreement to the Contract at the time it was presented to WDCI. (Record at 
00156). Consolidated did not challenge the representations made in the Colvin affidavit 
regarding these Contract documents. Furthermore, the affidavits of defendants Martin, 
Franks and Davis contain no facts or evidence disputing the County's contract claims or 
the representations made in the Colvin affidavit. 
Consolidated also ignored paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts contained in 
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion to Dismiss (Record 
at 00078) which states: 
Franks, as a agent of the Consolidated Group, represented 
seller Western Dairymen Cooperative in the transaction and 
Davis, as an agent of Consolidated Group, represented the 
buyer, Salt Lake County, in the transaction pursuant to a 
written disclosure agreement attached as Exhibit "B" to 
Plaintiffs Complaint. (Emphasis added). 
5
 A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 
"A". (Record at 00022). A copy of the Agency Disclosure Agreement attached to the Contract 
by Consolidated is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B". (Record 00026). Copies of the 
documents are also included in the Addendum. 
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Furthermore, in response to the County's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents to defendant Martin, a copy of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract, Bates stamped and sequentially numbered 249-253, including the 
Agency Disclosure Agreement (Record at 00534), was produced. The documents in 
Consolidated5 s own files confirmed the Agency Disclosure Agreement was part of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract. (Record at 00022, See, Paragraph 5). 
At the time of the hearing on the County's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
or for New Trial, the County argued that the allegations against Consolidated were 
contract claims not barred by the four year statute of limitations for torts.6 In support of 
its contract claim, the County argued that the Agency Disclosure Agreement standing 
alone was: (1) a written expression of mutual conditions; (2) signed by the parties to be 
bound; and (3) supported by adequate consideration because the County and WDCI gave 
up the right to have conflict free agents and Consolidated did not have to split the 
commission with another brokerage. (Record at 00663, page 15, lines 6 to 11). Counsel 
for Consolidated abandoned the "merger" theory during oral argument. (Record at 00663, 
page 37, lines 6 to 11). 
The trial court's May 8, 2000, Order attempted to clarify the prior order 
granting summary judgment and dismissing the Consolidated defendants. (Record at 
00645). In that Order, the Court states regarding the contract claims: 
6
 The Complaint was filed well within the six year statute of limitations for contracts. See, 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-23. 
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(1) Plaintiffs Complaint pled an action for breach of duties 
arising out of an alleged contract against the Consolidated 
Defendants; however, the Court finds that the "Agency 
Disclosure", attached to the Complaint and incorporated 
therein by reference, is not a contract; (2) The fiduciary duties 
alleged in the Seventh (7th) and Eighth (8th) Causes of 
Action of the Complaint, and which were described in the 
Agency Disclosure, were common law duties, not contract 
duties, because the duties of the real estate agents and brokers 
existed independent of any contract or agreement. Plaintiffs 
claims were tort claims, and, therefore, were barred by the 
four (4) year statute of limitations pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78-12-25(3); and (3) Even if the Court found the Agency 
Disclosure to be a contract, Plaintiff failed to create a disputed 
issue of material fact because there is no evidence that the 
Consolidated defendants knew or reasonably should have 
known of the latent defects on the property, or any other cause 
of action alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the 
Consolidated defendants could not have breached any duty 
arising out of or described in the Agency Disclosure. 
Summary judgment was, therefore, precluded by the existence of genuine issues of 
material facts regarding the Agency Disclosure Agreement. 
C. The Duties Under the Contract Involved Disputed Facts 
The trial court relied on Consolidated's disclosure duty analysis in reaching the 
conclusion articulated in the May 8, 2000, Order. Consolidated's duty analysis is based 
on Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) where the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that a seller's real estate agent had no duty to disclose latent defects to a 
buyer which were unknown to the real estate agent. 
The trial court's reliance on Schafir was misplaced because: (1) the case 
involved a tort claim, there was no contract defining the parties' respective duties of care 
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and diligence; (2) under its facts, the decision addresses only the duty of a selling agent to 
buyers; (3) it does not address the duties of a buyer's agent; and (4) it does not address the 
duties of the principal broker in a dual agency relationship.7 
In Schafir, the buyer sued the seller's agent, not her own agent, and not her 
broker who played both sides of the deal. The selling agent in Schafir did not enter into a 
dual contractual fiduciary relationship with both buyer and seller. Conversely, in this 
case Consolidated, its principal broker Martin, as well as Davis, Martin's agent and the 
buyer's real estate agent, are named in addition to Franks, Martin's agent and the seller's 
real estate agent. Consolidated, Martin, Davis and Franks entered into a contractual dual 
agency relationship with buyer and seller. Schafir concerned only a suit against the 
selling agent who had no contractual relationship with the buyer. 
In the instant case, the County contracted with and had a fiduciary relationship 
with Consolidated, Martin and Davis. Even Franks owed a contractual duty to the 
County to exercise reasonable care as WDCI's agent. [Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
7
 Consolidated also ignores Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 n. 1 (Utah 1986) (citing 
Easton v. Straussbuger, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383, 387 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984)) in which the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized the following standard applicable to a real estate broker: 
A real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds 
himself out to the public as having particular skills and knowledge 
in the real estate field. He is under a duty to disclose facts 
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property 
that are known to him or through reasonable diligence should 
be known to him. (Emphasis added) 
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paragraph 5, and Agency Disclosure Agreement, "Duties of Seller's Agent"]. Regardless 
of what Schafir says, this Court must ultimately look to the contractual duties undertaken 
by Consolidated, Martin, Davis and Franks and determine whether those contract duties 
were breached. 
D. The Breach of a Contract Duty is an Issue of Fact 
Of course, whether those contract duties were breached is also a question of 
fact. During the December 10, 1999, hearing on the County's Motion to Amend, counsel 
for Consolidated argued that even if there was a contract, the duties imposed were 
essentially independent common law duties. He next argued that there was no evidence 
of a breach of any duty. (Record at 00663, page 36). However, as a fiduciary and 
licensed broker, Martin, through his licensed real estate sales agents, was obligated to 
find out some information about the property. See, Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-
6-2.6.2.16.1(c) (("Full Disclosure") which obligates a buyer's licensed agent to tell the 
buyer all material information which the agent leams about the property). Furthermore, 
Utah Administrative Code Rule Rl 62-6-1 ("Improper Practices") requires a licensed 
broker to make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of the listing. 
The absence of a listing agreement is sufficient evidence of a breach of duty to 
create a question of fact. Moreover, Utah Administrative Code Rule Rl62-6-2.6.2.16.3.2 
imposes an additional duty of reasonable care and diligence in a dual agency transaction. 
A dual agency in real estate is analogous to a lawyer representing both the husband and 
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wife in a divorce. Additional duties are imposed on a lawyer under those circumstances 
to protect the individual interests of the respective parties. Here, Consolidated failed to 
respond to the additional duties imposed on licensed professionals in a dual agency by the 
administrative rules governing the real estate business, as adopted by the Utah 
Department of Commerce. 
Despite the real estate agents and broker's protestations that they knew nothing, 
genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Consolidated, through its 
broker and real estate agents, fulfilled the fiduciary duties imposed by contract and 
license. In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Martin, Franks and Davis 
submitted affidavits which represent only that they individually had no actual knowledge 
of the subsurface conditions at the time of the sale. No representations were made, 
however, regarding: the existence of any listing or brokerage agreements between WDCI 
and Consolidated; relevant information known by other Consolidated officers or agents, 
information disclosed or withheld by WDCI; or efforts by these real estate professionals 
to confirm the suitability of the property for its expressly stated intended use. 
In addition, "[t]he issue of negligence or breach of a legal duty is normally a 
question of fact for the jury. Accordingly, summary judgment is generally improper on 
the issue of negligence and only in clear-cut cases, with the exercise of great caution, 
should the court take the issue of negligence from the province of the jury." Kitchen v. 
Cal Gas Co., Inc. 821 P.2d 458, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Emphasis added) (internal 
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citations omitted). 
In Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Finan., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 
(N.M. App. 1984), the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision 
granting a summary judgment based on a broker's affidavit that he had no knowledge of 
defects. The Plaintiffs allegations against the broker included a claim of negligent 
misrepresentation for failure to discover defects. The Court of Appeals ruled that 
summary judgment in favor of the broker was improper because the broker failed to make 
a prima facie showing that he did not breach the standard of care of brokers in the 
community on the allegation of negligent failure to discover latent defects. 
Consolidated failed to offer any evidence regarding the professional standard of care in 
Utah for brokers, sales agents, and buyers agents to inquire regarding the conditions on 
the Property and suitability for its intended use. 
E. A Factual Dispute Exists Regarding Conditions on the Property 
Consolidated's position that it did not "know" of the existence of subsurface 
conditions ignores the actual language in the Franks and Davis affidavits on which it 
relied. Regarding the issue of undisclosed conditions, both affidavits actually state: 
Paragraph 4. "At no time did Affiant ever know,, nor was 
Affiant ever led to believe that there were subsurface 
concrete and waste pilings, footings, slabs, debris and other 
material under the surface of the Property." (Emphasis 
added). (Record at 00096 and 00102). 
Paragraph 6. "At no time did anyone at Western Dairymen 
tell Affiant or provide Affiant with any information that 
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would lead him to believe that the subsurface of the property 
was anything other than normal rock and dirt."(Emphasis 
added). (Record at 00096 and 00102). 
Based on the language in the affidavits, the factual inquiry was not limited to what these 
defendants actually knew, but whether under the circumstances, they had any reason to 
"believe" there may have been subsurface conditions. 
The affidavit of Lee Colvin, specifically challenges the defendants knowledge, 
reason to believe, and duty to inquire under the Agency Disclosure Agreement. 
Regarding the suitability of the property for the County's intended use, he states: 
Paragraph 8. "In the summer of 1993,1 contacted Charles L. 
Davis, a real estate sales agent with Consolidated Realty 
Group and, on behalf of the County, requested his assistance 
in locating a commercial site suitable for the construction 
of the office building described in the letter from the Health 
Department." (Emphasis added). (Record at 00155). 
Regarding the disclosure of information relating to the site and conditions of the offer, 
Mr. Colvin states: 
Paragraph 11. "In a letter addressed to Mr. Davis dated 
September 24, 1993,1 explained that I was preparing an offer 
on the 4.96 acres on the southeast corner of Woodoak and 
Vine Street for Mr. Davis, the County's agent, to submit to 
WDCI. I listed a number of terms and conditions to be 
included in the offer, including the disclosure by WDCI of 
any information regarding any environmental issues 
relating to the site. One of the listed conditions (No. 9) was 
the removal of the parking pad observed at the time of my 
visit to the property." (Emphasis added). (Record at 00156). 
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Paragraph 13. "...[T]he contract incorporates the terms and 
conditions described in my September 24th letter, with the 
exception of the provision regarding the removal of the 
parking pad. Mr. Davis recommended that this condition 
be deleted8 from the offer because the valuation report 
supported the offer price...." (Emphasis Added). (Record at 
00156). 
Consolidated did not challenge the representations made in the Colvin affidavit or any 
other affidavit submitted in response to the defendants. 
Furthermore, Mr. W. Lynn Cottrell, a corporate Vice-President of WDCI, 
testified in his deposition that although buildings had been removed, cement slabs and 
footings were "above the ground and obvious" (Record at 00401, lines 2 through 4). Mr. 
Cottrell's deposition testimony directly contradicts the representations made in the Franks 
and Davis affidavits that they did not know of or had no reason to believe in the existence 
of subsurface conditions. If the conditions were as "obvious" as claimed by Mr. Cottrell, 
then Consolidated had a duty to disclose the defects to the County. See, Shafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1984). One sworn statement under oath is all 
that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corporation v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Summary judgment was, 
therefore, precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material facts regarding the 
8
 Davis' recommendation is particularly relevant in light of the representations made by 
WDCI's counsel, David Little, regarding additional due diligence and more specific Contract 
conditions. Mr. Little's December 13, 1997, letter is attached to the affidavit of Craig W. 
Anderson. (Record at 00173). A copy of the Colvin Affidavit is included in the Addendum. 
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conditions on the Property. 
F. Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Conditions is a Factual Issue 
Consolidated's position that the broker and agents did not know and had no 
reason to believe in the existence of undisclosed conditions is a fact based issue and 
cannot be resolved by summary judgment. In Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 
297, 300 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict in a 
case involving claims of actual or constructive knowledge of a defective or dangerous 
condition. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in granting the motion on 
the issue of whether a party "knew or should have known" because the plaintiff submitted 
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, the two 
affidavits submitted by the County in opposition to Consolidated5s motion raise factual 
issues regarding whether the Consolidated defendants knew or should have known of the 
undisclosed subsurface conditions. 
Furthermore, defendant WDCI's answers to interrogatories (Record at 00278 to 
00295) raised factual issues regarding whether WDCI may have disclosed9 information to 
the Consolidated defendants regarding the existence of subsurface conditions.10 WDCI 
9
 Mr. Cottrell testified in his deposition that it is possible he informed Consolidated of the 
subsurface conditions. (Record at 00357 and 00358). He also testified that WDCI relied on 
Consolidated to represent its interests in the transaction. (Record 00363 and 00364). 
10
 See, Defendant WDCI's responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents. The responses to interrogatories 24,25 and 27 raise factual issues 
regarding whether WDCI made any disclosures to Consolidated regarding the existence of 
subsurface conditions on the property. (Record at 00288 and 00289). 
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supplemented its answers to interrogatories on May 10, 1999. If further discovery reveals 
that WDCI disclosed the information, then Consolidated knew of the conditions and had a 
duty to disclose the defects to the County independent of the higher standard of care 
imposed by the Contract documents. See, Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1284 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
At the time of the hearing on the County's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or 
for New Trial, the County referred to newly discovered evidence, specifically a November 5, 
1999, letter from defendant Martin, wherein he stated that Consolidated had not entered into 
a Listing Agreement with WDCI.11 Mr. Cottrell, however, previously testified in his 
deposition that it was his understanding that there was an arrangement with Consolidated for 
the sale of the property.12 Mr. Cottrell also testified that WDCI paid a commission to 
Consolidated as required by the Contract. A factual dispute exists regarding whether there 
was a listing agreement. This point is significant because rules13 adopted by the Utah 
Department of Commerce require a real estate licensee completing a listing agreement to 
make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of a listing. 
11
 (Record at 00663: transcript page 20 lines 22 to 25, and page 11 lines 1 to 5). 
12
 In a deposition taken on May 11,1999, W. Lynn Cottrell, a Vice-President of WDCI at 
the time of the transaction, testified that WDCI had a contract with Consolidated and that the 
terms of the contract were contained in the Real Estate Purchase Contract. (Record at 00357 and 
00358). Mr. Cottrell also stated that WDCI paid a commission to Consolidated as required by 
the terms of this Contract. (Record at 00360). 
13
 Utah Administrative Code Rule Rl 62-6-1. 
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The factual issue regarding the existence of a listing agreement is relevant 
because had there been a listing agreement as required by the Department of Commerce 
rules, Consolidated should have inquired regarding the conditions on the property and the 
suitability of the property for the County's intended use. This duty to inquire under 
Department of Commerce rules is independent from any contractual or common law duty. 
G. It Is Inappropriate to Weigh the Evidence on Summary Judgment 
Rule 56(c) requires that summary judgment be granted only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The Supreme Court found, in Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 
1984), that a motion for summary judgment can only be granted when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact", and "even assuming the facts asserted by the party 
moved against to be true, he could not prevail." The Court went on to state: 
Since the party moved against is denied the opportunity of 
presenting his evidence and his contentions, it is and should 
be the policy of the courts to act on such motions with great 
caution, to assure that a party whose cause might have merit is 
not deprived of the right to access the courts for the 
enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs. 
In its Complaint, the County alleges that the parties entered into a Contract 
which included an Agency Disclosure Agreement wherein Consolidated acknowledged 
that it represented both the buyer (the County) and the seller (WDCI) with respect to the 
purchase of the property. The Agency Disclosure Agreement identifies the fiduciary 
duties imposed on an agent representing both the buyer and seller. As previously noted, 
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the claims against Consolidated contained in the Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action 
specifically incorporate the general allegations in the Complaint, including the Contract 
and Agency Disclosure Agreement provisions which imposed more stringent fiduciary 
duties on the Consolidated defendants. The Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action 
specifically allege that the Consolidated defendants breached these fiduciary duties. 
Applying the standard of review adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Gadd, the 
County's factual allegations regarding the Contract and the more stringent fiduciary 
duties should be deemed to be true for the purpose of resolving the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Consolidated and the County both submitted affidavits in support of their 
respective positions on the Motion to Dismiss. Based on these affidavits, the trial court 
treated the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Under the facts in 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995), this Court found 
that the trial court, in granting summary judgment, gave more weight to some affidavits 
than to others. The Court found that on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry should be only whether material 
issues of fact exist. The Court went on to state: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to 
judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses 
or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the 
right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is 
to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon 
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any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. (Emphasis 
added). 
Consolidated relied solely on the affidavits of Martin, Franks and Davis, each 
alleging that they did not know of the subsurface conditions. Obviously, these affiants 
had a reason to deny any knowledge and their credibility in this matter is a consideration. 
Applying the Draper standard, the trial court may not weigh the evidence or judge the 
credibility of the affiants for either of the parties. Summary judgment should not have 
been granted and the County should have been given an opportunity to test the credibility 
of the Consolidated defendants at trial. 
In W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981), the 
trial court granted summary judgment in a quiet title action. On appeal, the appellant 
challenged the documents relied on by the trial court in granting summary judgment. The 
appellant argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because material issues of 
fact existed regarding whether the transaction was intended to be a loan or a sale. On 
appeal, this Court examined the record and determined that it revealed material issues of 
fact regarding the intent of the parties as expressed in the transactional documents. The 
Court reversed and remanded the case ruling that on a motion for summary judgment, it is 
inappropriate for a court to weigh evidence concerning the purpose of a document or the 
facts surrounding a transaction. The sole issue to be determined is whether there is a 
material issue of fact to be decided. In making that determination, a court should not 
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evaluate the credibility of a witness. It is of no moment that the evidence on one side may 
appear to be strong or even compelling, and documentary evidence is not dispositive if 
the intent and purpose underlying the documents are at issue. 
Under the facts in this case, the parties raised questions regarding the existence, 
purpose, intent and significance of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and Agency 
Disclosure Agreement. Summary judgment should not have been granted due to the 
existence of disputed issues of material facts regarding these transactional documents. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE THE 
BASIS FOR ITS RULING ON THE RULE 56(f) 
MOTION AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Consolidated's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss contained two separate points. (Record at 00073). The first point alleged that 
under Utah law, real estate agents have no duty to disclose latent defects in the absence of 
any knowledge. The second point alleged that the County's Seventh and Eighth Causes 
of action were tort claims barred by the four year statute of limitations. 
Although counsel for Consolidated prepared both proposed and revised Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, they were never adopted by the trial court. (Record at 
00300 and 00312). The trial court entered a memo in the record dated May 5, 1999, 
however, prior to the May 10, 1999, Order granting summary judgment. The memo was 
written in response to the pleadings submitted by Consolidated's counsel after the hearing 
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on the Motion to Dismiss, and states: 
In an order granting Summary Judgment, the court doesn't 
make findings of fact because there are no material issues of 
fact in dispute by definition. I don't disagree with the ruling 
as counsel's prepared it. But, I do not believe he's styled it 
correctly. Facts stated are undisputed facts not resolved by 
findings. I don't want to give the impression that I've 
weighed evidence on a motion for Summary Judgment. 
That's why I've not signed the order. (Record at 00328). 
The facts relied on by Consolidated were, however, disputed in the County's 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Memorandum in Opposition 
included a statement of disputed material facts and supplemental material facts. (Record 
at 00106 and 00109). Furthermore, the Memorandum in Opposition was supported by 
two counter-affidavits responding to Consolidated. (Record at 00153 and 00173). 
The trial court's May 10, 1999, Order granting Consolidated's Motion for Summary 
Judgment states only that the County's action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and under Utah law, real estate agents have no duty to disclose latent defects 
in the absence of knowledge. Furthermore, the Order states that the County's Rule 56(f) 
Motion is denied. (Record at 00334). 
In its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial, the County objected to 
the trial court's failure to designate the basis for its rulings on the contract claim and Rule 
56(f) Motion. In its Memorandum in support of the Motion, the County cited Alford v. 
Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), interpreting 
the requirement under Rule 52(a) that the trial court is required to make a brief statement 
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delineating the alternative grounds it accepted in granting summary judgment. The 
County asserted that under Alford, the trial court must disclose whether it found: (1) there 
was no Contract; (2) there was a Contract but the claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations; or (3) the Contract was merged into the deed. Furthermore, the Order should 
have articulated the basis for denying the Rule 56(f) Motion. 
Following the hearing on the County's Motion to Alter or Amend or for New Trial, 
the trial court issued an Order dated May 8, 2000. (Record at 00645). That Order sought 
to clarify the earlier Order on summary judgment by stating that: 
(1) Plaintiffs Complaint pled an action for breach of duties 
arising out of an alleged contract against the Consolidated 
Defendants; however, the Court finds that the "Agency 
Disclosure", attached to the Complaint and incorporated 
therein by reference, is not a contract. 
(2) The fiduciary duties alleged in the Seventh (7th) and 
Eighth (8th) Causes of Action of the Complaint, and which 
were described in the Agency Disclosure, were common law 
duties, not contract duties, because the duties of the real estate 
agents and brokers existed independent of any contract or 
agreement. Plaintiffs claims were tort claims, and, therefore, 
were barred by the four (4) year statute of limitations pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann §78-12-25(3). 
(3) Even if the Court found the Agency Disclosure to be a 
contract, Plaintiff failed to create a disputed issue of material 
fact because there is no evidence that the Consolidated 
defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the 
latent defects on the property, or any other cause of action 
alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the Consolidated 
defendants could not have breached any duty arising out of or 
described in the Agency Disclosure. 
(4) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time to 
conduct discovery is denied. 
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Although the May 8,2000, Order more clearly states the grounds for the earlier 
Order granting summary judgment, it fails to articulate any basis for denying the Rule 
56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery. This is a critical omission 
because the County's inability to conduct discovery precluded any opportunity to pursue 
its claims against Consolidated. 
Furthermore, the May 8, 2000, Order certifies the summary judgment dismissing 
Consolidated as a final appealable order. The certification asserts that the remaining 
claims against WDCI are distinct from those asserted against Consolidated, and stand on 
their own. Again, the trial court did not enter any findings and conclusions in support of 
the summary judgment, denial of the Rule 56(f) Motion, or Order certifying the summary 
judgment as a final appealable order. 
In Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 
1991), this Court concluded that certification is generally precluded where there is a 
significant factual overlap between the operative facts of the certified and unlitigated 
claims. 
The Kennecott decision was followed by Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 
139 (Utah 1992) which requires trial courts to enter findings supporting the conclusion 
that judgments certified as final under Rule 54(b) are final. The findings must explain the 
lack of factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims to satisfy the 
Kennecott standard. A claim is not separate if a decision on the claims remaining below 
41 
would moot the issues on appeal. Here, if the continuing proceedings against WDCI 
establish that the subsurface conditions were disclosed to Consolidated by WDCI, then 
Consolidated had knowledge of the conditions and breached its duty to the County, 
thereby rendering this appeal moot. The trial court's certification of the summary 
judgment was, therefore, improper. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the County requests that: (1) the trial court's Order 
denying the County's Rule 56(f) Motion be reversed and the County be allowed to 
conduct additional discovery against Consolidated; and (2) the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Consolidated be reversed and the County be allowed to 
proceed with its claims against Consolidated. 
DATED this &C> day o f ^ ^ < ~ ^ L , 2000. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
By ,—J d_ 
L X R ^ I G W. ANDERSON 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds 
of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of Ihe evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
(b) Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made 
either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings 
of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
History: Amended effective Jan. 1,1987. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 52, F R C P 




Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, 
or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 




Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim; counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
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purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any oflfending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
History: Amended effective November 1,1997, 




Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own 
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 




Rl 62-6-1. Improper Practices. 
6.1.1. False devices. A licensee shall not propose, prepare, or cause to be prepared any 
document, agreement, closing statement, or any other device or scheme, which does not reflect 
the true terms of the transaction, nor shall a licensee knowingly participate in any transaction in 
which a similar device is used. 
6.1.1.1. Loan Fraud. A licensee shall not participate in a transaction in which a buyer enters 
into any agreement that is not disclosed to the lender, which, if disclosed, may have a material 
effect on the terms or the granting of the loan. 
6.1.1.2. Double Contracts. A licensee shall not use or propose the use of two or more 
purchase agreements, one of which is not made known to the prospective lender or loan 
guarantor. 
6.1.2. Signs. It is prohibited for any licensee to have a sign on real property without the 
written consent of the property owner. 
6.1.3. Licensee's Interest in a Transaction. A licensee shall not buy, sell, or lease or rent any 
real property as a principal, either directly or indirectly, without first disclosing in writing on the 
purchase agreement or the lease or rental agreement his true position as principal in the 
transaction. A licensee will be considered to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he is 
an owner, officer, director, partner, member, or employee of an entity which is a principal in the 
transaction. In the case of a licensee who is a stockholder but who is not an officer, director or 
employee of a corporation which is a principal in the transaction, the licensee will be considered 
to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he owns more than 10% of the stock of the 
corporation. 
6.1.4. Listing Content. The real estate licensee completing a listing agreement is responsible 
to make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of the listing. 
6.1.4.1. Net listings are prohibited and shall not be taken by a licensee. 
6.1.5. Advertising. This rule applies to all advertising materials, including newspaper, 
magazine, Internet, e-mail, radio, and television advertising, direct mail promotions, business 
cards, door hangers, and signs. 
6.1.5.1. Any advertising by active licensees that does not include the name of the real estate 
brokerage as shown on Division records is prohibited except as otherwise stated herein. 
6.1.5.2 If the licensee advertises property in which he has an ownership interest and the 
property is not listed, the ad need not appear over the name of the real estate brokerage if the ad 
includes the phrase "owner-agent" or the phrase "owner-broker". 
6.1.5.3. Names of individual licensees may be advertised in addition to the brokerage name. 
If the names of individual licensees are included in advertising, the brokerage must be identified 
in a clear and conspicuous manner. This requirement may be satisfied by identifying the 
brokerage in lettering which is at least one-half the size of the lettering which identifies the 
individual licensees. 
6.1.5.4. Advertising teams, groups, or other marketing entities which are not licensed as 
brokerages is prohibited if the advertising states "owner-agent" or "owner-broker" instead of the 
brokerage name. 
6.1.5.5. Advertising teams, groups, or other marketing entities which are not licensed as 
brokerages is permissible in advertising which includes the brokerage name upon the following 
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conditions: 
(a) The brokerage must be identified in a clear and conspicuous manner. This requirement 
may be satisfied by identifying the brokerage in lettering which is at least one-half the size of the 
lettering which identifies the team, group, or other marketing entity; and 
(b) The advertising shall clearly indicate that the team, group, or other marketing entity is 
not itself a brokerage and that all licensees involved in the entity are affiliated with the brokerage 
named in the advertising. 
6.1.5.6 If any photographs of personnel are used, the actual roles of any individuals who are 
not licensees must be identified in terms which make it clear that they are not licensees. 
6.1.5.7. Any artwork or text which states or implies that licensees have a position or status 
other than that of sales agent or associate broker affiliated with a brokerage is prohibited. 
6.1.5.8. Under no circumstances may a licensee advertise or offer to sell or lease property 
without the written consent of the owner of the property or the listing broker. Under no 
circumstances may a licensee advertise or offer to sell or lease property at a lower price than that 
listed without the written consent of the seller or lessor. 
6.1.5.9 If an active licensee advertises to purchase or rent property, all advertising must 
contain the name of the licensee's real estate brokerage as shown on Division records. 
6.1.6. Double Commissions. In order to avoid subjecting the seller to paying double 
commissions, licensees must not sell listed properties other than through the listing broker. A 
licensee shall not subject a principal to paying a double commission without the principal's 
informed consent. 
6.1.6.1. A licensee shall not enter or attempt to enter into a concurrent agency representation 
agreement with a buyer or a seller, a lessor or a lessee, when the licensee knows or should know 
of an existing agency representation agreement with another licensee. 
6.1.7. Retention of Buyer's Deposit. A principal broker holding an earnest money deposit 
shall not be entitled to any of the deposit without the written consent of the buyer and the seller. 
6.1.8. Unprofessional conduct. No licensee shall engage in any of the practices described in 
Section 61-2-2, et seq., whether acting as agent or on his own account, in a manner which fails to 
conform with accepted standards of the real estate sales, leasing or management industries and 
which could jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes the violation of any 
provision of Section 61-2-2, et seq. or the rules of this chapter. 
6.1.9. Finder's Fees. A licensee may not pay a finder's fee or give any valuable consideration 
to an unlicensed person or entity for referring a prospect in a real estate transaction, except as 
provided in this rule. 
6.1.9.1. Token gifts. A licensee may give a gift valued at $50 or less to an individual in 
appreciation for an unsolicited referral of a prospect which resulted in a real estate transaction. 
6.1.10. Referral fees from lenders. A licensee may not receive a referral fee from a lender. 
6.1.11. Failure to have written agency agreement. To avoid representing more than one 
party without the informed consent of all parties, principal brokers and licensees acting on their 
behalf shall have written agency agreements with their principals. The failure to define an 
agency relationship in writing will be considered unprofessional conduct and grounds for 
disciplinary action by the Division. 
6.1.11.1. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a seller shall 
have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the agency. 
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6.1.11.2. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a buyer shall 
have a written buyer agency agreement with the buyer defining the scope of the agency. 
6.1.11.3. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent both buyer and 
seller shall have written agency agreements with both buyer and seller which define the scope of 
the limited agency and which demonstrate that the principal broker has obtained the informed 
consent of both buyer and seller to the limited agency as set forth in Section R162-6.2.16.3.1. 
6.1.11.4. A licensee affiliated with a brokerage other than the listing brokerage who wishes 
to act as a sub-agent for the seller, shall, prior to showing the seller's property: 
(a) obtain permission from the principal broker with whom he is affiliated to act as a 
sub-agent; 
(b) notify the listing brokerage that sub-agency is requested; 
(c) enter into a written agreement with the listing brokerage consenting to the sub-agency and 
defining the scope of the agency; and 
(d) obtain from the listing brokerage all information about the property which the listing 
brokerage has obtained. 
6.1.11.5. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who act as a property manager 
shall have a written property management agreement with the owner of the property defining the 
scope of the agency. 
6.1.11.6. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a tenant shall 
have a written agreement with the tenant defining the scope of the agency. 




Rl 62-6-2. Standards of Practice. 
6.2.1. Approved Forms. The following standard forms are approved by the Utah Real Estate 
Commission and the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licensees: 
(a) September 30, 1999, Real Estate Purchase Contract (mandated use of this form is July 1, 
2000); 
(b) January 1,1999 Real Estate Purchase Contract for Residential Construction; 
(c) January 1,1987, Uniform Real Estate Contract; 
(d) October 1,1983, All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(e) October 1, 1983, All Inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(f) January 1, 1999, Addendum/Counteroffer to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(g) January 1, 1999, Seller Financing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(h) January 1, 1999, Survey Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(i) January 1, 1999, Buyer Financial Information Sheet; 
(j) January 1, 1999, FHA/VA Loan Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(k) January 1, 1999, Assumption Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(1) January 1, 1999, Lead-based Paint Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(m) January 1, 1999, Disclosure and Acknowledgment Regarding Lead-based Paint and/or 
Lead-based Paint Hazards. 
6.2.1.1. Forms Required for Closing. Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out 
forms in addition to the standard state-approved forms if the additional forms are necessary to 
close a transaction. Examples include closing statements, and warranty or quit claim deeds. 
6.2.1.2. Forms Prepared by an Attorney. Any licensee may fill out forms prepared by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee or the attorney for the seller or lessor to be used in place of any 
form listed in Rl 62-6.2.1 (a) through (g) if the buyer or lessee or the seller or lessor requests that 
other forms be used and the licensee verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee, or the attorney for the seller or lessor. 
6.2.1.3. Additional Forms. If it is necessary for a licensee to use a form for which there is no 
state-approved form, for example, the licensee may fill in the blanks on any form which has been 
prepared by an attorney, regardless of whether the attorney was employed for the purpose by the 
buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, brokerage, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling blank 
legal forms. 
6.2.1.4. Standard Supplementary Clauses. There are Standard Supplementary Clauses 
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to Real Estate Purchase 
Contracts by all licensees. The use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be 
considered the unauthorized practice of law. 
6.2.2. Copies of Agreement. After a purchase agreement is properly signed by both the 
buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of each participating licensee to cause copies thereof, 
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the buyer and seller with whom the licensee is 
dealing. The licensee preparing the document shall not have the parties sign for a final copy of 
the document prior to all parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to the terms thereof. 
After a lease is properly signed by both landlord and tenant, it is the responsibility of the 
principal broker to cause copies of the lease to be delivered or mailed to the landlord or tenant 
with whom the brokerage or property management company is dealing. 
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6.2.3. Residential Construction Agreement. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
Residential Construction must be used for all transactions for the construction of dwellings to be 
built or presently under construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has not been issued. 
6.2.4. Employee Licensee. A real estate licensee working as a regular salaried employee as 
defined in section 1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the employer or leases real 
estate owned by the employer, may only do so and may only be compensated directly by the 
employer under one of the following conditions: (1) the licensee is a principal broker; (2) the 
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom the licensee affiliates for sales or 
management transactions; or (3) the employer contracts with a principal broker so that all 
employed licensees are affiliated with and supervised by a principal broker. 
6.2.5. Real Estate Auctions. A principal broker who contracts or in any manner affiliates 
with an auctioneer or auction company which is not licensed under the provisions of Section 
61-2-1 et seq. for the purpose of enabling that auctioneer or auction company to auction real 
property in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all aspects of the auction comply with the 
requirements of this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to real estate licensees in real 
estate transactions. Auctioneers and auction companies who are not licensed under the 
provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. may conduct auctions of real property located within this 
state upon the following conditions: 
6.2.5.1. Advertising. All advertising and promotional materials associated with an auction 
must conspicuously disclose that the auction is conducted under the supervision of a named 
principal broker licensed in this state; and 
6.2.5.2. Supervision. The auction must be conducted under the supervision of a principal 
broker licensed in this state who must be present at the auction; and 
6.2.5.3. Use of Approved Forms. Any purchase agreements used at the auction must meet 
the requirements of Section 61-2-20 and must be filled out by a Utah real estate licensee; and 
6.2.5.4. Placement of Deposits. All monies deposited at the auction must be placed either in 
the real estate trust account of the principal broker who is supervising the auction or in an escrow 
depository agreed to in writing by the parties to the transaction. 
6.2.5.5. Closing Arrangements. The principal broker supervising the auction shall be 
responsible to assure that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of each real estate 
transaction arising out of the auction. 
6.2.6. Guaranteed Sales. As used herein, the term "guaranteed sales plan" includes: (a) any 
plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed to be sold or; (b) any plan whereby a licensee or 
anyone affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real estate if it is not purchased by a third 
party in the specified period of a listing or within some other specified period of time. 
6.2.6.1. In any real estate transaction involving a guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall 
provide full disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee: 
(a) Written Advertising. Any written advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales 
plan" shall include a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligible, costs and 
conditions may apply and advising the seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the 
guaranteed sales agreement. This information shall be set forth in print at least one-fourth as 
large as the largest print in the advertisement. 
(b) Radio/Television Advertising. Any radio or television advertisement by a licensee of a 
"guaranteed sales plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if any conditions and 
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limitations apply. 
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements. Every guaranteed sales agreement must be in writing and 
contain all of the conditions and other terms under which the property is guaranteed to be sold or 
purchased, including the charges or other costs for the service or plan, the price for which the 
property will be sold or purchased and the approximate net proceeds the seller may reasonably 
expect to receive. 
6.2.7. Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or 
principal, the licensee shall clearly disclose in writing to his respective client(s) or any 
unrepresented parties, his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the 
parties entering into a binding agreement with each other. The disclosure shall become part of 
the permanent file. 
6.2.7.1. When a binding agreement is signed in a sales transaction, the prior agency 
disclosure shall be confirmed in the currently approved Real Estate Purchase Contract or, with 
substantially similar language, in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to that binding 
agreement. 
6.2.7.2. When a lease or rental agreement is signed, a separate provision shall be 
incorporated in or attached to it confirming the prior agency disclosure. The agency disclosure 
shall be in the form stated in Rl 62-6.2.7.1, but shall substitute terms applicable for a rental 
transaction for the terms "buyer", "seller", "listing agent", and "selling agent". 
6.2.7.3. Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency relationship 
with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent upon initial contact with 
the other agent. 
6.2.8. Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal broker or 
branch broker informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in which the licensee is 
involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received funds on behalf of the 
principal broker or in which an offer has been written. 
6.2.9. Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch brokers 
shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all licensees affiliated 
with them. 
6.2.9.1. A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if: 
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules 
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written policies or 
instructions; and 
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees receive 
adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and 
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage; 
and 
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and 
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and 
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation. 
6.2.9.2. The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special 
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the 
broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities. 
6.2.10. Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a transaction 
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will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in addition to a real estate 
commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction. 
6.2.11. Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee for referral of prospects to builders 
must be paid to the licensee by the principal broker with whom he is licensed and affiliated. All 
fees must be disclosed as required by Rl62-6.2.10. 
6.2.12. Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a licensee refers a prospect to a 
manufactured home dealer or a mobile home dealer, under terms as defined in Section 58-56-1, 
et seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be paid to.him by the principal broker with 
whom he is licensed. 
6.2.13. Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a principal broker to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, in a real estate transaction as an inducement to use the services of a real estate 
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the services of a brokerage, is permissible and is 
not an illegal sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, who will not be obligated to pay a real estate commission in a transaction, the principal 
broker must obtain from the party who will pay the commission written consent that the 
inducement be offered. 
6.2.14. "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees have an affirmative duty to disclose in 
writing to buyers and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "due-on-sale" clause in an 
underlying encumbrance on real property, and the potential consequences of selling or 
purchasing a property without obtaining the authorization of the holder of the underlying 
encumbrance. 
6.2.15. Personal Assistants. With the permission of the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated, the licensee may employ an unlicensed individual to provide services in 
connection with real estate transactions which do not require a real estate license, including the 
following examples: 
(a) Clerical duties, including making appointments for prospects to meet with real estate 
licensees, but only if the contact has been initiated by the prospect and not by the unlicensed 
person; 
(b) At an open house, distributing preprinted literature written by a licensee, so long as a 
licensee is present and the unlicensed person furnishes no additional information concerning the 
property or financing and does not become involved in negotiating, offering, selling or filling in 
contracts; 
(c) Acting only as a courier service in delivering documents, picking up keys, or similar 
services, so long as the courier does not engage in any discussion of, or filling in of, the 
documents; 
(d) Placing brokerage signs on listed properties; 
(e) Having keys made for listed properties; and 
(f) Securing public records from the County Recorders' Offices, zoning offices, sewer 
districts, water districts, or similar entities. 
6.2.15.1. If personal assistants are compensated for their work, they shall be compensated at 
a predetermined rate which is not contingent upon the occurrence of real estate transactions. 
Licensees may not share commissions with unlicensed persons who have assisted in transactions 
by performing the services listed in this rule. 
6.2.15.2. The licensee who hires the unlicensed person will be responsible for supervising 
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the unlicensed person's activities, and shall ensure that the unlicensed person does not perform 
activity which requires a real estate license. 
6.2.15.3. Unlicensed individuals may not engage in telephone solicitation or other activity 
calculated to result in securing prospects for real estate transactions, except as provided in 
R162-6.2.15.(a) above. 
6.2.16. Fiduciary Duties. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf owe the 
following fiduciary duties to the principal: 
6.2.16.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the seller or the lessor 
instead of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the seller or 
lessor; 
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all material 
information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the transaction; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the seller or lessor which would likely weaken the seller's or lessor's bargaining position 
if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the seller or lessor to disclose the 
information. This duty does not require the agent to withhold any known material fact 
concerning a defect in the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform his obligations; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.2. Duties of a buyer's or lessee's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the buyer or lessee owe the buyer or lessee the following 
fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the buyer or lessee instead 
of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the buyer or 
lessee; 
(c) Full Disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the buyer or lessee all material 
information which the agent learns about the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform 
his obligations; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the buyer or lessee which would likely weaken the buyer's or lessee's bargaining 
position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the buyer or lessee to disclose 
the information. This duty does not permit the agent to misrepresent, either affirmatively or by 
omission, the buyer's or lessee's financial condition or ability to perform; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.3. Duties of a limited agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf 
who act as agent for both seller and buyer, or lessor and lessee, commonly referred to as "dual 
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agents," are limited agents since the fiduciary duties owed to seller and to buyer, or to lessor and 
lessee, are inherently contradictory. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf may 
act in this limited agency capacity only if the informed consent of both buyer and seller, or lessor 
and lessee, is obtained. 
6.2.16.3.1. In order to obtain informed consent, the principal broker or a licensee acting on 
his behalf shall clearly explain to both buyer and seller, or lessor and lessee, that they are each 
entitled to be represented by their own agent if they so choose, and shall obtain written 
agreement from both parties that they will each be giving up performance by the agent of the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that they are giving up their right to demand undivided loyalty from the agent, 
although the agent, acting in this neutral capacity, shall advance the interest of each party so long 
as it does not conflict with the interest of the other party. In the event of conflicting interests, the 
agent will be held to the standard of neutrality; and 
(b) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that there will be a conflict as to a limited agent's duties of confidentiality and 
full disclosure, and shall explain what kinds of information will be held confidential if told to a 
limited agent by either buyer or seller, or lessor and lessee, and what kinds of information will be 
disclosed if told to the limited agent by either party. The limited agent may not disclose any 
information given to the agent by either principal which would likely weaken that party's 
bargaining position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the principal to 
disclose the information; and 
(c) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to the buyer and 
seller, or lessor and lessee, that the limited agent will be required to disclose information given to 
the agent in confidence by one of the parties if failure to disclose the information would be a 
material misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of the parties to fulfill 
their obligations. 
(d) The Division and the Commission shall consider use of consent language approved by 
the Division and the Commission to be informed consent. 
6.2.16.3.2. In addition, a limited agent owes the following fiduciary duties to all parties: 
(a) Obedience, which obligates the limited agent to obey all lawful instructions from either 
the buyer or the seller, lessor and lessee, consistent with the agent's duty of neutrality; 
(b) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(c) Holding safe all money or property entrusted to the limited agent; and 
(d) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.4. Duties of a sub-agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who 
act as sub-agents owe the same fiduciary duty to a principal as the brokerage retained by the 
principal. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, : 
Plaintiff, : MEMO 
vs. : Case No: 980906392 
WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE I, : Judge: MCCLEVE, SHEILA K 
Defendant. : Date: 5/4/99 
Clerk: lynettg 
In an order granting Summary Judgment the court doesn't make 
findings of fact because there are no material issues of fact in 
dispute by definition. I don't disagree with the ruling as 
counselfs prepared it. But, I do not believe hefs styled it 
correctly. Facts stated are undisputed facts^not resolved by 
findings. I don't want to give the impression that Ifve weighed 
evidence on a motion for Summary Judgment. Thats why I've not 
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Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 0 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Deputy 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR, McCONKLE & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Consolidated, et al. 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Facsimile: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, 
INC.; CONSOLIDATED REALTY 
GROUP; WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR.; 





CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP, 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR., HERMAN 
L. FRANKS, AND CHARLES L. 
DAVIS 
Civil No. 980906392-MI 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Defendants Consolidated Realty Group's, William K. Martin, Jr.'s, Herman L. Franks', 
and Charles L. Davis' (hereinafter collectively "Consolidated Group") Motion to Dismiss and for 
Summary Judgment, together with Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on February 19, 1999 with Michael L. Deamer, Esq. appearing on behalf 
of the Consolidated Group, Craig W. Anderson, Esq. appearing on behalf of Plaintiff Salt Lake 
County, and Robert Stolebarger, Esq. appearing on behalf of Defendant Western Dairymen 
Cooperative, Inc., and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and exhibits filed therein and 
having heard argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Consolidated 
Group's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted and the 
above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis on the grounds that said action 
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and under Utah law, real estate agents have no 
duty to disclose latent defects of property in the absence of any knowledge of said defects. 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance is denied. 
DATED this /V day of /Ujk^j , 1999. 
Y THE COURT 
Honorable She; 
District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MATT TNG 
I hereby certify pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
DEFENDANTS CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP, WTTJTAMK. MARTIN, JR., HERMAN 
L. FRANKS AND CHARLES L. DAVIS, this O day of May, 1999, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Craig W. Anderson, 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Patrick F. Holden, 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake County 
2001 South State, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
Attorneys for Western Dairymen Cooperativi 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 





Third Juciclai District 
M Y 0 4 20G0 
Bv- 8ALru'gCOUWTY^V . O 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (#0078) 
Deputy District Attorney 
PATRICK F. HOLDEN (#6247) 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)468-2655 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake County 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Oepu erit 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, 
INC.; CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR.; HERM FRANKS; 




TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 980906392MI 
Judge Sheila McCleve 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third 
District Court Judge, on April 18,2000, with Craig W. Anderson, Deputy District Attorney, 
appearing on behalf of Plaintiff Salt Lake County; Mark J. Williams appearing on behalf of 
Defendants Consolidated Realty Group, William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles 
L. Davis (collectively referred to as "Consolidated"); and Robert Stolebarger appearing on behalf 
fi H P A 0 
Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend Complaint 
Civil No. 980906392 
Page two 
of Defendant Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. The Court having heard the matter and there 
being no opposition to the motion and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to Amend its Complaint is granted. Defendants answers to the Amended Complaint or 
other responsive pleadings are due within ten days after the date of the entry of this Order 
pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 4 day of^SJ/000. 
BY THE COURTS 5 *• 
; _ ; * - _ » _ ^ ' ^ _ 1 ^ j 
**- I ^ V* ;-: v\y *w 
Ronald E. Nehring, Ji 
Third District Court 
irr; 
Approved as to form: 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
Attorney for Defendant WDCI 
Dated: ^(7^((r^ 
MarkJ.Wifjtems 
Attorney for Consolidated Defendants 
Dated: H H11"*» 
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Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend Complaint 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the O day of May, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant WDCI 
Mark J. Williams 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
136 East South Tempe, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks and 
Charles L. Davis 
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MARK J. WILLIAMS #3494 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Herman L. Franks and Charles L. Davis 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V . j 
WESTERN DAIRYMAN COOPERATIVE, ] 
INC., CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; ] 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR., HERMAN L. ] 
FRANKS; and CHARLES L. DAVIS, ] 
) ORDER AND UTAH R.CIV.P. 54(b) 
) CERTIFICATION OF FINAL ORDER 
I Civil No. 980906392 MI 
1 Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Motion To Alter or Amend the Judgment, or For a New Trial, pursuant to 
Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Sheila K. McCleve, Third District Court Judge, in the above-entitled case on December 10,1999, 
with Craig Anderson and Patrick F. Holden appearing on behalf of plaintiff, Salt Lake County, 
and Mark J. Williams appearing on behalf of defendants, Consolidated Realty Group, William K. 
Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis (collectively referred to as "Consolidated"), 
and with Robert Stolebarger appearing on behalf of defendant, Western Dairyman Cooperative, 
Inc., but not participating in oral argument. Having reviewed its prior Summary Judgment 
dismissing defendants, Consolidated Realty Group, William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, 
FILE9 DISTRICT C0UST 
Third Judicial District 
and Charles L. Davis, dated May 10,1999, and plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
or For a New Trial, and the memoranda submitted in support thereof by plaintiff, as well as 
defendant Consolidated's Response to Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For a New Trial, 
and having heard argument of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment or For a New Trial is denied and that the Summary Judgment 
dismissing defendants Consolidated Realty Group, William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, 
and Charles L. Davis, is affirmed for the reasons originally set forth in said May 10,1999 ruling. 
Furthermore, the Court clarifies that: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint pled an action for breach of duties arising out of an alleged 
contract against the Consolidated Defendants; however, the Court finds that the "Agency 
Disclosure", attached to the Complaint and incorporated therein by reference, is not a contract. 
2. The fiduciary duties alleged in the Seventh (7th) and Eighth (8th) Causes of Action of 
the Complaint, and which were described in the Agency Disclosure, were common law duties, 
not contract duties, because the duties of the real estate agents and brokers existed independent of 
any contract or agreement. Plaintiffs claims were tort claims, and, therefore, were barred by the 
four (4) year statute of limitations pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§78-12-25(3). 
3. Even if the Court found the Agency Disclosure to be a contract, Plaintiff failed to 
create a disputed issue of material fact because there is no evidence that the Consolidated 
Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the latent defects on the property, or any 
other cause of action alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the Consolidated Defendants could 
not have breached any duty arising out of or described in the Agency Disclosure. 
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4. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time to conduct discovery is denied. 
UTAH R.CIV.P. 54(b) CERTIFICATION OF FINAL ORDER 
As required under Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b) the Court further determines the following: 
1. The Summary Judgment granted in favor of defendants, Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis, disposes of all claims of 
plaintiff with prejudice and upon the merits which plaintiff possesses or might claim against the 
dismissed defendants. 
2. The Order of Summary Judgment, which is affirmed by the foregoing Order denying 
plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or For a New Trial, would be appealable, but for 
the fact that the other defendant, Western Dairyman Cooperative, Inc., remains in the action. 
The separate causes of action for different legal theories must be proven against the remaining 
defendant, Western Dairyman Cooperative, Inc., which claims are distinct from those asserted 
against the dismissed defendants. There are no cross-claims asserted by defendant Western 
Dairyman Cooperative, Inc. against defendants Consolidated Realty Group, William K. Martin, 
Jr., Herman L. Franks, or Charles L. Davis, and the claims of plaintiff against these dismissed 
defendants stand on their own. As such, the Summary Judgment dismissing the Consolidated 
defendants should be considered a final order. 
3. There are no just reasons for delay of any potential appeals since the causes of action 
against these dismissed defendants, acting in their role as real estate agents/brokers, are separate 
and distinct from the causes of action alleged by plaintiff against the remaining defendant, 
Western Dairyman Cooperative, Inc., as seller of the subject property. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS AND HEREBY ORDERS that the Summary 
- 3 -
Judgment granted and affirmed herein above in favor of defendants Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks, and Charles L. Davis, against plaintiff is a final order 
within the meaning of Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). 




APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
r3ig/Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
Attorney for Defendant 
Western Dairyman Cooperative 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed via United States 
• 4 -
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Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the LLP day of 
~7>Q0ft . as follows: 
Craig W. Anderson 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Patrick F.Holden 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State #S3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 




LO .AL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
•rr*«tvfftfv RC A i t o Q # '™*b * ^ ^ W m , ' n ' C o n l r , c l* ^ » h S1"* 1 > W " * * * •» *»» leensed real tittle agents we this term, but the Buyer end Bit Sefter inty 
*
# u u <
 N»My^k»wdffr»glo»tfer or delete g 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT pUa^t. <j "• 
The Buyer _ s a l t - U k e Counfcy r-a-lmdy-corporatc-dnd pol l ef c 9 ^ ^ , < t ^ i l * f p f ^ f e f y o* c n 1 V J <r-
lo Brokerage, as Earnest Money Deposit $ _ ^ p _ j w ^ 1 g r ) n Ihe lorm ol - - G a s h 0 o / 7 # « - 0 . 
wHWri three business days after Acceptance of this oiler to purchase by all parties. . » \\ ^/ ' ' 
by on 
Brokerage Phone Number 
~ . ^
 0 F F E R T Q p U R C H A S E 
1. PROPERTY: —Approximately. 5.acreiJuL-descr1hpri on attachftri Ariripnriiim 11 
city —Murray '> Coun<y —S-a l t -Lake to*-
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale shaH include all fixtures presently attached to the Property: plumbing, healing, air-conditioning and 
venting fixtures and equipment water healer, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and 
door scteens.storm doors, window Winds, awnings, installed television antenna, satellite dishes and system, walt-to-walt carpets, automatic garage door 
opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs. The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate BHl d 
Sato wfth warranties as to fitfe: N o n e — • _ 
1.2 Excluded Items. The loHowmg items are excluded irom this sale .
 wmmmm . 
2. PURCHASE PRICE ANO FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay tor the Property as follows: 
$ J-7 0 9 Earnest Money Deposit 
t ftffc Existing Loan: Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan m this approximate amount presently payable at $ 
per month Including principal. Interest (presently at _. % per annum), O real estate taxes, O property Insurance premium 
and O mortgage insurance premium. Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption tees. Seller O shaW Q shall not be 
released from liability on said loan. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance at Closing shell be adjusted In D Cash D Other 
$ \\f~b Proceeds from New Loan: Buyer reserves the right to apply lor any ol the Mowing loans under the terms described below. 
D Conventional D FHA O VA D Olher . Seller agrees to pay $ - toward 
Olscount Points and Buyer's other loan end closing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion. ^ 
D For a fixed rate loam Amortized and payable over years, interest shall not exceed % per annum; monthly principal and 
Interest payment shall not exceed % , or 
D For an Adjustable Rale Mortgage (ARM): Amortized and payable over years; Initial Interest rale shall not exceed % per 
annum; inifiai monthly principal and interest payments shall not exceed $ Maximum Ule Time interest rale shall not 
exceed % per annum. 
$ WfA •- Seller Financing: (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
$ Other: -
* ~48 ! r~999~0GP** * f , c * °* P u t c n ° * Price In Cash at Closing 
$ -4 8£lo o o : 0oTota! Purchase Price 
2.1 Existing/New Loan Application. Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within -N / /y- calendar days (Application Date) after 
Acceptance. Buyer will have made Loan Application only when Buyer has: (a) completed, signed, and delivered (o the Lender the initial loan application and 
documentation required by the Lender; and (b) paid all loan application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer will continue to provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. If, within seven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller, Buyer talis to provide to Seller 
written evidence that Buyer hns made Loan Application by the Application Date, then Setter may. prior to the Qualification Date below, cancel this Contract 
by providing written notice to Rtryer. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy ol such written notice, shall release lo Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as 
Seller's exclusive remedy, ihe Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorisation from Buyer. 
2.2 Quaffffcation. Buyer and the Property must qualify for a loan for which application has been made under section 2.1 within - f | / f t - calendar days 
(Qualification Date) efter Acceptance. The Property is deemed qualified If, on or before the Qualification Date, the Property, tn Its current condition and tor 
the Buyer's Intended use. has appraised at a value not less than the Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed qualified If, on or belore the Qualification Dale, 
the Lender verifies m writing thai Buyer has been approved as ol life verification dale. 
2.3 QuafHieatfon Contingency. If Seller has not previously voided this Contract as provided In Section 2.1. and either the Property or Buyer has failed to 
qualify on or before the Qualification Date, either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three calendar days 
alter the QuaftfteaUon Oale. otherwise Buyer and the Property are deemed qualified. The Brokerage, upon receipt ol a copy of such written notice, shall 
return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization of Seller. 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or belore F e b r u a r y f^ ?& * , 9 , -94— Closing shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have 
signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this ContracL by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions 
and by applicable law; and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents, have been delivered to the escrow/title compnny tn the lorm ol 
cashier's check, collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 /2) of the escrow doting tee. unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
tn writing. Taxes and assessments lor the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth tn Ihls Section. Unearned 
deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing. Prorations set forth In this Section, shall be made as ol Ojdate ot Closing O date of 
possession O other . _ _ _ . 
4. POSSESSION. Unless otherwise agreed In writing by the parties, Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within — g / j hours after Closing. 
8. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing ol this Contract the listing agent ^uh^tJ-A+tHj £ *>w r » • • / K I T * fep l fesM 
dfietter d Buyer, end the selling agent ^^^ido^fjLJi^^Wikanis O Setter C^fiuyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this 
Contract written disclosure of the egency relatioT«sfllp6\ was proVWed to h l m / h e r . ^ ^ ) Buyer's Initials ( ^ J i ^ e l l e r ' s Initials. 
•.TITLE TO PROPERTY ANO TITLE INSURANCE. (a| Seller has. or shall have al Closing, lee title lo the Property and agrees lo convey such title to Buyer by 
genera) warranty deed, free ol financial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10.6; (b) Setter agrees lo pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing with a 
current standard form owner's policy of title Insurance In the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy shell conlorm with Seller's obligations 
under subsections (a) and (b) above. Unless otherwise agreed under subsection 8.4. the commitment shall conlorm with the title insurance commitment 
provided under Section 7. 
*?. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No taler than - - calendar days after Acceptance. Setter will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures: (a) 
a Seller property condition disclosure for Ihe Property, signed and dated by Seller, (b) a commitment for the policy ol title Insurance required under Section 
6. lo be Issued by the title Insurance company chosen by Seller. Including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment; (c) a copy of all 
loan documents relettng to any loan now existing which wlff encumber the Properly after Closing; and (a*) a copy of aft leases affecting the Property not. 
expiring prhr to Closing. Setter agrees to pay any title commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b). 
8. GENERAL CONTINGENCIES. In addition to Qualification under Section 2.2 Ihls oiler is: (a) subject to Buyer's approval of the content ot each ot the items 
relerenced In Section 7 above; and fb) O Is O Is not subject to Buyer's approval of an Inspection ot the Property. The Inspection shall be paid lor by Buyer 
. and shall be conducted by an Individual/company of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such Inspection and a walk-through Inspection 
under Section I t and to make the Property available tor the same. 
8.1 Buyer shaft have * £ of fttftityo^ys alter Acceptance In which to review the content of Seller Disclosures, and. it the Inspection contingency 
ahpftes. to complete and evaluate the inspection ot the Propcrtyjend to determine, H, In Buyer's sole discretion, the content ot all Seller Disclosures 
(Including the Property Inspection) Is acceptable, 
8.2 tt Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Setter regarding e Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided in subsection 8.1 
above, that document or Inspection wilt be deemed approved or waived by Buyer. 
Paae1o!2naoes S*n#r'« i«m-t. 1 i ^ n . i - ~Ll * ~-» - * " "^ 
0.311 Buyer objects, Buyer and Sellers ave seven cnlendardays niter receipt ol the objections to resolve Bt. s objections. Setter may. but shall not 
be required to. resolve Buyer's objections. II Buyer's objections are not resolved within Ihe seven calender days. Buyer may void this Contract by providing 
written notice to Seller within Ihe same seven calendar days. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, shall return to Buyer the 
Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement ol any further written authorization Irom Seller. It this Contract Is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's objection Is 
deemed to liave been waived. However, lhfs waiver does not effect ffwse Hems warranted In Section 11. 
0.4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8.3 shall be in writing and shaft be speefffcaffy enforceable as covenants of this Contract 
f. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. TWs offer Is made subject to: S O P Afldfinrium .. 
The terms of attached Addendum 9 ^ are Incorporated into this Contract by tltls reletence. 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Setter's warranties lo Buyer regarding Ihe condition ol Ihe Property ere limited to the following: 
10. t When seller delivers possession ol the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-dean end free ol debris and personal belongings: 
10.2 Seller wHt deliver possession ol (he Property to Buyer with Ihe plumbing, pkimbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces In working order; 
10.3 Seller wilt deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the root and foundation tree of teaks known to Setter, 
f 0.4 Seller will delKptr possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Properly In working order and In compliance 
with governmental regulations; 
105 Seller will be responsible lor repairing any ol Seller's moving •related damage to the Property; 
10.8 At Closing. Seller wilt bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed In writing by Buyer and wit! discharge ail 
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed: and 
10.7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge ol arty claim or notice ol an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been resolved. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Belore Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through'* inspection ol the Property to 
determine whether or not Items warranted by Seller in Section 10. t, 10.2.10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted condition and to verify items Included In Section 
1.1 are presently on the Property. II any item is not In the warranted condition. Seller will correct repair or replace It as necessary or, with the consent ol 
Buyer, escrow an amount af Closing to provide lor such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" Inspection, or to claim 
during ihe "walk-through" Inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1, or fs not m the condition warranted in Section 
10, shell not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or ol the warranties contained In Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial 
alterations or Improvements fo the Properly shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. II Buyer or Seller Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, end Seller Disclosure^ constitute the entire Contract 
between the parlies and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the 
parties. This Contract cannoi be changed except by wrillen agreement ol Ihe parlies. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract including but not limited to the disposition ol the Earnest 
Money Deposit, ihe breach or termination of this Contract, or (he services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted lo mediation m accordance 
wtlh the Utah Real Estate Buyer /Seder Mediation Rules ol the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall include representations made by the 
parties, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the safe, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect of the Property to which this Contract 
pertains. Including without limitation, allegations ol concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and /or fraud. Each party agrees to bear its own costs ol 
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parlies pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation falls, the procedures applicable and remedies 
avellabfe under tttls Contract shall apply. Nothing in INS Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable retfel pending mediation. By 
marking this box D . and adding their initials. Ihe Buyer ( fljtf). and Ihe Seller ( \M^/tgree that mediation under this Section 15 Is not mandatory, but Is 
optional upon agreement of alt parlies. " 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain Ihe Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money Deposit 
. mod sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. II Seller defaults, in addition to return ol the Earnest Money Deposit Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as 
liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or to sue Seller tor specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the 
liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay Ihe liquidated damages lo Buyer upon demand Where a Section ol this Contract provides a specific remedy the 
perries Mend that Ihe remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out ol this Contract the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's lees. 
11. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it Is authorized by: (a) Section 2. Section 8.3 or Section 
15; (b) separate written agreement of the parties: or (c) court order. 
19. ABROGATION. Except lor express warranties made in this Contract the provisions ol this Contract shall not apply alter Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of toss or damage to the Property shaft be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time Is ol the essence regarding the dates set lor th In litis transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties. 
Performance under each Section of tills Contract wWch references a dale shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date. 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) OOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission ol any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed lacsimite transmission, 
Shatf be the sama as deffvory of an original. It the transaction Involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed In counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an oiler or counleroller ol the other (a) signs Ihe ofle* or counter where noted 
lo Indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the oiler or counleroller has been signed as required. 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seller does not accept this offer by 
_ £ £ & ) AM ty^M Mountain Time ffJrat^Wf 2L.H jg J L 3 . , this otter shall lapse; and the Brokerage she! return the Earnest Money 
Deposit to Buyer. 
±Jjiy^^m>^ MV+v*JpjLP IAJ&LZXZU, v.p art^^ 
(Buyer's Signature) ' (Oiler Oate) (Buyer's Signature) '(Oiler Date) 
C? lA IUAA* Xtjtj* ]£« a ^ 6 dale shell be the Offer Reference Date. 
_Tp Ti^e^,.^,.^ P^P^l^nr^ J .WOU HMO*} ^ U OT <*11~2P4* 




a c c e p t a n c e of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing oiler on the terms and conditions specified above. 
'(Setter's Signature) (Oate) (Time) (Setter's Signature) (Qete) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
D Refection: Seller Rejects the foregoing oiler. (Seller's Initials) /,{Pm«) (Time) 
O Counter Offst! Seller presents lor Buyer's Acceptance the terms ol Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modlllcattons as specified In the attached 
Counter Offer i 
Page 2 of 2 pages Seller's Initials ( ) Dale - Buyefs Initials ( ) Date . 
Tmro*tfAM«ovrosTTHeuTAH«AiESTAT*cdM^ p r* f\r\<*\ 
TO [ 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
„ This is an AOOENOUM/OOUHTCn Orrcn to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC*) with an Offer Reference Date 
of QfiCembenJLZ . , 1 9 - 9 3 .Including all addenda and counter offers, 
between _Sa.LLXake.County^-a-body-corporate *"d pnUHr nf fho Cfafo ^f t^^h •as Buyer, 
and —Intennoxiniaiji MIU ProducecsJtesoc.1 aUon ,as Seller. 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC. and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control. Afl other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
t 
-L—This nffpr 1s subject to. nuye&is-^atisIacJ^on-uxL-aiL-envlrnnrnpnhal audit to be performed 
at Buyer's expense. Seller will provide Buyer with copies of any environmental audits 
or reports already In Seller's possession, Including reports on removal of underground 
tanks and hazardous materia}.spills. 
2. Seller will provide Buyer with any studies, surveys, or Information pertinent to the 
property now In seller's possession. 
-33 TM* nffor u mihjprf- fn nuypr'* approval of an appraisal of value to be obtained at 
Buyer's expense. 
A, ThU nffpr u subject to final approval by the Board of Salt lake County Commissioners. 
5, Buyer and Seller will split on a 50% - 5QX basis those closing costs normally shared 
equally by Buyers and Sellers or real property. * 
_JL Any commission paid tn rpal estate agents will he paid hy Seller 
- Poscrlptlon of property? Approximately 5 acres of vacant land on tho Southeast comor of 
Vine Street and Woo do a k Land, Murray, Utah, and further described as Sldwell Nos: 
22-17-102-009 contain1ng approximately 1.93 acres, 22-03-354-001 containing approximately 
1.62 acres, and 22-08-354-002 cibtatnlng approximately 1.51 acres. 
^Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until 5-QQ [ ) A.M. (Yf>M. Mountain Time, 
these terms In accordance with Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, this c 
toe 1 accept 
9 Jer  I  r  it  ti   f t  . fess so accepted, this offer shall lapse. 
f-Buyer (J Seller Signature ~ ^ , / Date 
I 1 Buyer ( ) Seller Signature / ' / ,» • 7 Date 
— ' ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEB OFFER 
CHECK ONE j ! M 
_ . W^cceptance: p\SoHerr.l) Buyej: hereby accepts these terms. 
l ) Buyer { f e l l e r Signature Date Time 
11 Buyer ( ] Seller Signature Date. Time 
| ) Rejection: ( ) Seller ( J Buyer rejects these terms. 
_ _ _ _ _ {Initials) (Date) (Time). 




Wiicn you enter into a diacusuon with a real estate agent rrgzrdmg a nrai csutc transaction, you should, from the outset, understand who 
UV real estate agent » representing in the transaction. More importantly, you should understand how out agency rciauonswp impact* vour 
business reiauonshxp with the real estate agent and the Buyer or Seller. 
Duties of Seller's Agent 
A real estate agent who has listed a Seller's property for sale acts as the agent for the Seller only and has a fidueary duty o£ loyalty to the 
Seller. In practical terms, the Seller has hired the agent to sell tnctr property and that agent shouie attempt to ootain for the Seller the mos: 
favorable sales pnee and terms. Although the Sellers agent has this ftducary duty to the Seller, that agent is. by law, responsible to alt 
prospective Buyers to treat them with honest}-, fair dealing, and with good faith. A Seller's agent unocr a listing agreement with StzUcr acts 
as the agent for the Seller only. A scar's agent or a subagcrtt of that agent has the following affirmative obligations: (To the Seller; A 
fioucary duty of utmost care. Intcgnty. honesty, and loyalty in dealings wtth the Seller: (To xttc Buyer and the Seller) (a) A dun* to exercise 
reasonable care, skills, and diligence m performance of the agent's duues: (b) A duty of honesty and fair dealing with good faith: (e) A cuty 
to disclose all facts known to the agent which materially aflec the property that are not known to. or within the diligent attention ane 
observation of. the panics. 
Duties or Buyer's Agent 
A real estate agent can. with a Buyer's wmtcn consent, defining how the agent win be paid, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. As agent 
working on behalf of the Buyer, tne agent has a ficucary auty of loyalty to the Buyer. In pracucal terms, that means the Buyer's agen: is 
concerned with the Buyer's best interests In the transaencn. mcudmg attempong to obtain for the Buyer the most favorable sales pnee and 
terms. A selling agent can. with a Buyer's consent, agree to ac as agent for the Buyer only. In these situations, the agent is not the Seller's 
agent, even If by agreement the agent may receive a commission from the Seller. An agent acung only for tho .Buyer has the following 
aiftrmauvc obiiptions: (To the Buyer) (a) A fidueary duty of utmost care, intcgnry. honcsry. and loyalty in dealings with the Seller: (To the 
Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to exorese reasonable are sldis and diligence in performance of the agent's duties: (b> A duty of hencsry 
and fair dealing wtth good faith: (c) A duty to disdose all fac^ taown to the agent which matcnafiy affect the value of property that arc net 
known to or withm the dSigenyticwuiLi* «mu UUiervaucn-or me pames. "" 
Duties of Agent Representing both Buyer and Seller 
A real estate ageru. cither acang direcuV or though one or mora i^wUitif l^ iws i . -uy ii'jijil} be ine igcnt'oTboth the Seller and the Buyer 
m a transactor- but only with the Jmowiedge and consent of bom the Seller and the Buyer. In a dual agency sttuauon. the agent tzs the 
following affirmative obligations to both the Seller and the 3uyer: (a) A fidueary duty of utmes; care, mtcgnry. henesry. and lcyairy m 
ceaimgs with me Seller and the Buyer: (b) Other cuues to me Seller and the Buyer as sattc above m mcr respecsve secuens. in rcprescnsr.g 
bam Seiicr and Buyer, me agent may not. wimou: the express perrusston or the respecave pzTr^. c s iosc to the other parry trat me Seucr 
vrZ accept a pnee less man me isang pnee or mat the Buyer win pay a pnee greater man me pne; offered. 
Duties of Buver and Seller 
Tne above cuaes of real estate agcrus in a real esate transaczen do not rebevt a Seller or a Buyer from me respenstmar.- to cscnasc gsca 
buzness judgment m proteczng tner ressecave interest. You snould careruiiy reaa all aETsemcnts to assure mat they acccuatcry express 
your uncersandmg of the transactor.. If legal or tax aevtee is ccsred. consul: a competent profcsscnai attorney or acrsuntant. 
ConSmatior. of Agency Disclosure 
At the slpung of this agreement, the following agency rciascnshipts) ls:arc hereby connrmed for me 
^>^SGL6^njt Bffit^ is The real estate age ; the agent of (crce one whi 
Acknowledgement 
(Signature of Licensee) 
liwe acknowledge receipt of a copy of this disclosure and cennrmaaon. and undersund and agree with the agency reiatienship confirmed 
hcrem. 
Date, Tune 
3lTr3VSELLHiv Y Q^^lM^ 2-£&+^(]l^ £*Ut. Date. 
- ^ MtHtfifr^ J!^^^&n*^lcn^ T^f^^9^ 
Time 






DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (#0078) 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
PATRICK F. HOLDEN (#6247) 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)468-2655 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Salt Lake County 
S8 SEP 21 PH 5: 15 
m THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, 
INC.; CONSOLIDATED REALTY GROUP; 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN, JR.; HERMAN L. 
FRANKS; and CHARLES L. DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEE 
COLVTN IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 980906392MI 
Judse Sheila McCleve 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Affiant, Lee Colvin, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters and things set forth herein. 
2. I am currently employed by Salt Lake County in the Contracts and 
00153 
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Procurement Department's Real Estate Section. I have been employed by Salt Lake 
County since 1984. 
3. I was licensed by the Department of Commerce as a real estate sales agent 
from 1972 to approximately 1980, and was licensed as a broker from approximately 1980 
to 1990. I am familiar with the roles, functions, and state licensing requirements for 
brokers and sales agents. Brokers and sales agents must be licensed to engage in the real 
estate business. The licensing requirements and professional standards uniformly apply 
notwithstanding the level of sophistication of the parties involved in a particular real 
estate transaction. 
4. I am familiar with the real property more specifically described in the 
Complaint in this matter and which was acquired by the County in 1994 from the 
Intermountain Milk Producers Association also known as the Western Dairymen 
Cooperative, Inc. ("WDCI"). 
5. During the period of my employment with the County, I have been directly 
involved in the acquisition of real property for roads, flood control, parks, golf courses, 
jails, office buildings, support facilities and other public improvements. 
6. I was personally involved in the negotiations to acquire the real property 
described in this Complaint in this matter. 
7. In a letter dated June 9,1993, the Health Department requested the Real 
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Estate Division's assistance in locating a commercial site suitable for the construction of 
an office building to be occupied by the Division of Environmental Health. A copy of the 
letter is attached as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated herein. 
8. In the summer of 1993,1 contacted Charles L. Davis ("Davis"), a real estate 
sales agent with Consolidated Realty Group ("CRG"), and on behalf of the County, 
requested his assistance in locating a commercial site suitable for the construction of the 
office building described in the letter from the Health Department. Davis agreed to look 
for property on behalf of the County as a buyer. 
9. Mr. Davis subsequently identified several properties as potential sites, 
including two properties owned by WDCI located on the east and west sides of Vine 
Street in Murray, Utah. 
10. Following Davis' identification of the WDCI site in July, 1993,1 walked 
the subject property. At that time, the property was vacant ground covered with weeds. I 
observed what appeared to be a striped asphalt and concrete parking pad on a portion of 
the property. I was aware the property was previously occupied by Hi-Land Dairy and 
that the buildings had been demolished years ago. However, no evidence of the 
buildings, foundations or any other structural elements were visible at the time I walked 
the property. Site surveys and engineering and other site preparation work for the 
building did not occur until after the closing date. 
n 
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11. In a letter addressed to Mr. Davis dated September 24, 1993,1 explained 
that I was preparing an offer on the 4.96 acres on the southeast corner of Woodoak and 
Vine street for Mr. Davis, the County's agent, to submit to WDCI. I listed a number of 
terms and conditions to be included in the offer, including the disclosure by WDCI of any 
information regarding any environmental issues relating to the site. One of the listed 
conditions (No. 9) was the removal of the parking pad observed at the time of my visit to 
the property. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit "B" and is incorporated by 
reference. 
12. I arranged for an independent MAI appraisal to confirm the value of the 
property between the date of the letter to Mr. Davis and the offer to WDCI. The 
valuation report also did not disclose any latent conditions affecting the value of the 
property. 
13. The County entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("Contract") with 
WDCI dated on or about December 24,1993. A copy of the Contract is attached as 
Exhibit "C" and is incorporated by reference herein. The Contract incorporates the terms 
and conditions described in my September 24th letter, with the exception of the provision 
regarding the removal of the parking pad. Mr Davis recommended that this condition be 
deleted from the offer because the valuation report supported the offer price. CRG 
n n i ~* s 
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attached an Agency Disclosure Agreement ("Disclosure Agreement") to the Contract at 
the time it was presented to WDCI. 
14. Prior to the closing date, under a cover letter dated on or about January 5, 
1994, from WDCI to Davis, WDCI provided documentation regarding the demolition of 
buildings on both the east and west sides of Vine Street, the removal of underground 
storage tanks and other environmental conditions. Mr. Davis subsequently gave me this 
information without further comments or recommendations. A copy of the letter is 
attached as Exhibit "D" and is incorporated by reference herein. 
15. The transaction closed on or about April 25, 1994. Neither CRG, Martin, 
Davis, Franks nor WDCI disclosed that the buildings had been "partially demolished", the 
existence of concrete footings under fill or any other subsurface conditions prior to the 
closing date. 
16. In my professional experience, I have never before been involved in a real 
estate transaction involving the "partial demolition" of structures where the above ground 
demolition debris was removed and the footings and foundations were left in place and 
covered by fill. 
DATED this / / day of September, 1998. 
~7M 
LEE COLVIN, Affiant 
n n 1 ~ 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me on this [$%—day of September, 1998 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Xjl4L^2JL±^ 






STATE OF UTAH 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 2.1 -^day of September, 1998, a true and correct copy 
of the foreoing Affidavit of Lee Colvin was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant WDCI 
Michael L. Deamer 
RANDLE DEAMER ZARR ROMRELL & LEE 
139 East South Temple #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants Consolidated Realty Group, 
William K. Martin, Jr., Herman L. Franks and 
Charles L. Davis 
AA J, A\^XS<~<^-4_J(JZ<4L4--PJ^ du 
C17vii.doc 
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^ • 4T 
610 South 200 East 
It lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax: 801-534-4502 
Executive Director 
y L Gibbons, M.D.r M.P.H. 
534-4599 
inistrative Services Director 
ihn inch Morgan, M.8.A. 
534-4511 
ironmental Health Director 
i D. Sadler, R.S., IVLS.P.H. 
534-4510 
ily Health Services Director 
Bonnie Bullock, O . 
468-2841 
June 9, 1993 
Dick Chamberlain, Director 
Contracts and Procurement 
2001 S State N4500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Dear Dick: 
The Health Department has a critical need to relocate our 
Division of Environmental Health in order to expand the 
clinical service needs at the 610 South 200 East 
building. 
We intend to use funds from fees that we have collected 
(and will continue to collect) within our Environmental 
Health Division for the purchase of land and construction 
of a building. 
We request your assistance in helping us identify 
available land that would accommodate a two story 17,500 
square foot building with an attached 2,300 sq. foot 
garage/service bay facility (about 2 1/2 acres) in a 
central valley location ideally between approximately 
4500 South and 7200 South and between 700 West to 700 
East. 
I am also asking that you begin the consultant selection 
process for contracting with an architectural firm to 
develop architectural plans for the building. 
We will ask the Commission to appropriate funding for the 
construction phase of the project as part of the 1994 
Budget process. 




John Inch Morgan, >s^ \ 
Acting Director C \ 
JIM/JEB/jb 
cc: Commissioner Brent Overson 
Chris Segura 
i E v E M T 
K 0 T E C T nniRi 
September 24, 1993 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Charlie Davis 
Consolidated Realty Group 
175 E. 400 S., Suite 710 
SLC, UT 84111 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Salt Lake County is preparing an offer on the 4*96 
acres on the southeast corner of Woodoak and Vine St. for 
you to present to Western General Dairy with the following 
terms and conditions: 
1. Purchase price $2*25 per square foot = $486,000.00, to 
be paid in cash at closing, which shall be within 90 
days of offer & acceptance. 
2. Seller to provide survey and title insurance. 
3. Seller to provide all information currently 
available on environmental issues relating to the 
site, including removal of underground tanks, spills 
of hazardous materials, etc. 
4. Subject to purchaser obtaining satisfactory results on 
further environmental testing and soil sampling within 
the 90 day period. Seller will extend 90 day period 
for testing if purchaser is diligently pursuing 
testing and needs additional time to complete tests in 
progress. Site must be found free of contamination 












Anthony W. Mitchell, Ph.a. 
(DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR 
Richard L Chamberlain, CPI 
OlVISiON DIRECTOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTS 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N4500 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-3100 






Subject to approval by Murray City of adding emission 
control testing bays to the proposed office building 
which the purchaser proposes to build on the site. 
Subject to MAI appraisal in the amount of the purchase 
price or greater. Cost of appraisal to be split by 
purchaser and seller. 
Subject to release of funds for purchase by Salt Lake 
County Commission within the 90 day period. 
County will pay no brokerage fees - all such fees to 
be paid by Seller. 
Concrete slabs and asphalt to be removed from site by 
seller, or purchaser to receive credit for amount of 
low bid to remove such. 
00183 
I have been instructed to make an offer based on the above 
criteria by John Inch Morgan/ acting director of the City-
County Health Dept. We have the support of Commissioner 
Overson in making an offer on this property for the stated 
price/ though he has not seen or approved the other terms 
as yet* We also have the support of the other 
commissioners for the purchase of property for an 
environmental health building/ though they have not yet 
seen or approved this site* 
If the above terms are acceptable/ I will instruct our 
attorney to draft an offer immediately for presentation to 
the County Commission for approval* Upon obtaining the 
offer executed by the Commission/ I will forward it to you 
for acceptance by the seller* 
I m R_AL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRAV, r 
SJJtSjJ^ T W | h * ^•••y biding Contrac,l/tflah Stale Law requires that deemed real estate agenli use Ihli lorm, but the Buyer and the Seller may oTrom»»i»» 
legally agree In writing to alter or delete provisions of this form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Buyer _ S a 4 t - k a k e ~ G o U n t - y - r - a - b o d y ~ e o r p O r a f e e - a n d - f > o H f?K£9 ^  PfJ>&*UflifefPieVeriJkelbribed below and delivers 
to Brokerage, as Earnest Money Deposit $ _ { w _ f j p i j
 g r In the form of fash to be deposited 
within three business days after Acceptance of this offer to purchase by nil parties 
UQr&olLb^&t^Jhrtl -tf S^-^flfl^eived
 by on (Dale) 
Brokerage Phone Numbei 
— ^ . . _ „ . . ^
 0 F F E R T Q p U R C H A S E 
i. PROPERTY: —Approximately 5 acres frs descrlbed-an attached Addendum il 
city —Hurray Coun,v —S-al t-take umh 
f 11ncluded Items Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, eIr-condlUoning and 
venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, bulU-ln appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and 
door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, Installed television antenna, satellite dishes and system, wall-to-wall carpets, automatic garage door 
opener and transmitter^), fencing, trees and shrubs The following personal property shall also be included In this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of 
Sale with warranties as to title |yQ
 n g -
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay tor the Property as follows: 
$ | ; 0 Q Earnest Money Deport 
% ft Jfo Existing loan: Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan In this approximate amount presently payable at $ « _ 
per month Including principal, Interest (presently at % per annum), D real estate taxes, O property Insurance premium 
and D mortgage insurance premium Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption tees Setter D shall O shall not be 
released from liability on said loan Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance at Closing shall be adjusted In D Cash D Other 
$ Wfh Proceeds from New Loan: Buyer reserves the right to apply for any of the following loans under the terms described below 
O Conventional D FHA O VA O Other . Seller agrees to pay $ . toward 
Discount Points and Buyer's other loan and closing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion.
 A 
D for a fixed rate loan- Amortized and payable over years, interest shall not exceed % per annum; monthly principal and 
interest payment shall not exceed $ , or 
D For an Adjustable Rale Mortgage (ARM)* Amortized and payable over _ years; Initial Interest rate shall not exceed % per 
annum; initial monthly principal and Interest payments shall not exceed $ Maximum Life Time Interest rate shall not 
exceed % per annum 
$ f | / / \ Seller Financing: (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
$ Other: . 
$ _ jnc_nQg-n (^» l»nce of Purchase Price In Cash at Closing 
$ -^Q^QQ^QoTolal Purchase Price 
2 1 Existing/New Loan Application. Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within -M/f t - calendar days (Application Date) afler 
Acceptance Buyer will have made Loan Application only when Buyer has (a) completed, signed, and delivered 10 the Lender the initial loan application and 
documentation required by the Lender, and (b) paid all loan application fees as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender II, within seven catondnr days after receipt oi written request horn Seller. Buyer felts to provide to Sottor 
written evidence that Buyer has made Loan Application by the Application Date, then Seller may, prior to the Qualification Date below, cancel this Contract 
by providing written notice to Buyer The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written notice, shall release lo Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as 
Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Buyer 
2 2 Qualification. Buyer and the Property must qualify for o loan for which application has boen made undor section 2 t within - f l / / \ - calendar days 
(Qualification Oate) after Acceptance The Proporty Is doomed qualified II, on or before the Qualification Date, the Properly. In Ms curroht condition and lor 
the Buyer's Intended use, has nppralsed at a value not loss than Ihe Total Purchase Price Buyer Is deemed qualified H, on or before Ihe Qualification Date, 
the Lender verifies In writing that Buyer has been approved as of the verification date 
2 3 Qualification Contingency It Seller has not previously voided this Contract as provided In Section 2 t. and either the Property or Buyer has tailed to 
qualify on or before the Qualification Oate, either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three calendar days 
after the Qualification Date, otherwise Buyer and the Property are deemed qualllled The Brokerage, upon receipt ol a copy of such written notice, shall 
return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without Ihe requirement of any further written authorization of Seller 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or before F e b r u a r y _ f | L X £ " - . ** - 9 4 — Closing shall occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have 
signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/ title company), all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions 
and by applicable law; and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents, have been delivered lo the escrow/title company in the lorm of 
cashier's check, collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (t /2) of the escrow Cfoalng fee, unless otherwise agreed by ihe parties 
In writing Taxes and assessments lor the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth In this Section Unearned 
deposits on tenancies shall be translerred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth In this Section, shall be made as ol D^ate ol Closing D date ol 
possession D olher . ——„ . .—— 
4. POSSESSION. Uhless otherwise agreed In writing by Ihe parties. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within — 2 4 h ? u r 9 ^ , l c5 l ° i ! i " 0 r 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY C 
QBeller D Buyer, and the selling i „ ^ _ .
 y f . . 
Contract written disclosure of the agency relalfeftfilp(s) was provided to him/her tfy^ fyj}) Buyer's Initials ( ^ ^ J S i 
6.TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Seller has. or shall have at Closing, lee title to the Property and agrees to convey such title to Buyer by 
general warranty deed, tree ot tlnanctal encumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6. (b) Seller agrees lo pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing with a 
current standard form owners policy of title Insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price, (c) the title policy shall conform with Seller's obligations 
under subsections (n) and (b) above Unless otherwise agreed under subsection 8 4, the commitment shall conlorm with the title Insurance commitment 
provided under Section 7. 
*7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than .
 r cnlondar days alter Acceptance, Sollor will dollvor lo Buyer the lollowlng Seller Disclosures (n) 
a Seller property condition disclosure for thePrVerly, signed and dated by Seller, (b) a commitment lor the policy ol title Insurance required undor Section 
8, to be Issued by Ihe title Insurance company chosen by Soller. Including copies ol all documenls listed as Exceptions on Ihe Commllment. (c) a copy ol all 
loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber Ihe Property alter Clotlng and (d) a copy ol all leases allecllng the Properly not 
expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any title commllment cancellation charge under subsection (b) 
8. GENERAL CONTINGENCIES. In addition to Qualification under Section 2 2 this otler Is (a) subject to Buyers approval ol the content ol each ol the items 
referenced In Section 7 above, and fb) D Is D Is not subject to Buyer'a approval ol an Inspection ol the Properly The Inspection shall be paid for by Buyer 
and shall be conducted by an Individual /company of Buyer's choice Seller agrees lo fully cooperate with such Inspection and a walk-lhrough Inspection 
under Section 1t and to make the Properly available (or Ihe same 
8 1 buyer shall have JZ. otifartJirjiiys aller Acceptance In which to review the content ol Setter Disclosures, and. It the Inspection contingency 
applies, to complete and evaluate the Inspection ot Ihe Properlyjend to determine, II. in Buyer's sole discretion, the content ol all Seller Disclosures 
(Including the Property Inspection) Is acceptable 
8 2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided In subsection 8 1 
8 3 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve Buyer's objections Seller may, but shall not 
be required to, resolve Buyer's objections If Buyer's objections are not resolved within the seven calendar days. Buyer may void this Contract by providing 
written notice to Seller within the same seven calendar days The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, shall return to Buyer the 
Earnest Money Dtposll without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller If this Contract is not voided by Buyer. Buyer s objection Is 
deemed to have been waived However, this waiver does not affect those Hems warranted In Section tt 
0 4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8 3 shall be In writing and shall be specifically enforceable as covenants of this Contract 
9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This olfer Is made subject to SpP Addendum 
The terms of attached Addendum ff \ are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following 
101 When seller delivers possession of the Properly to Buyer, It will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings, 
10 2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces In working order; 
10 3 Seller will deliver possession of the Properly to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller, 
10 4 Seller will delifor possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property In working order and in compliance 
with governmental regulations, 
10 5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property; 
10 8 At Closing, Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Properly which are assumed In writing by Buyer and will discharge alt 
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed, and 
10 7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been resolved 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk through" Inspection of the Property to 
determine whether or not Hems warranted by Seller In Sootlon 101,10 2,10 3 and 10 4 are In the warranted condition and to verify Horns Included In Section 
1 1 are presently on the Property It any Item Is not In the warranted condition, Sellor will corroct, repair or roplnce It as nocossnry or, with the consont of 
Buyer, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement The Buyer s failure to conduct a "walk'through' Inspection, or to claim 
during (he "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not Include all items referenced In Section 11 or Is not In the condition warranted in Section 
10. shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer's rights under Section 1 1 or of the warranties contained In Section 10 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered Into, and no substantial 
alterations or Improvements to the Properly shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
13 AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the 
parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, Including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest 
Money Deposit, the breach or lermlnalion of IhJs Contract, or the services relallng to this transaction, shall tlrsl be submitted lo mediation in accordance 
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association Disputes shall include representations made by the 
parties, any Broker or other person or entity In connection with the sale, purchase, financing condition or other aspect of the Property to which this Contract 
pertains. Including without limitation, allegations ol concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and /or fraud Each party agrees lo bear its own costs of 
mediation Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding If mediation tails the procedures applicable and remedies 
available under this Contract shall apply Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation By 
marking this box D , and adding their initials, the Buyer ( AJJJ) - a n d , n e Seller ( ty jAA9 r®° that mediation under this Section 15 Is not mandatory, but Is 
optional upon agreement of ail parlies ^ 
16. DEFAULT, tt Buyer defaults Setter may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money Deposit 
and sue Buyer to enforce Seller s rights If Seller defaults, In addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as 
liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or to sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages If Buyer elects to accept the 
liquidated damages, Seller agrees lo pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy the 
parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney s fees 
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Oeposll shall not be released unless It Is authorized by (a) Section 2. Section 8 3 or Section 
15, (b) separate written agreement of the parlies, or (c) court order 
19. ABROGATION Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions ol this Contract shall not apply after Closing 
20. RISK OF LOSS All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing 
21 TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE Time Is of the essence regarding the dates set lorth In this transaction Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all pnrties 
Performance under each Section of this Contract which relerences a dale shall be required absolutely by 5 00 PM Mountain Time on tho slated dote 
22 FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS Facsimile transmission ol any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, 
shall be the same as delivery of an original If the transaction Involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterparts 
23 ACCEPTANCE Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer responding to an oiler or counteroffer of the other (a) signs the oiler or counter where noted 
to Indicate acceptance, and lb) communicates to the other party or the other parly's agent that the olfer or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Properly on the above terms and conditions II Seller does not accept this olfer by 
jt~*Q3 AM C ^ M Mountain Time fffir^tj^V fit 2~H 19 - 3 - i , this offer shall lapse, and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
Deposit to Buyer 
(Buyer's Signature) * (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) '(Offer Date) 
• • I 1 . . . X A The above date shall be the Offer Reference Dale 
Tj f^ini44»<TT% ^MMH^I^^—^- "A* * ' **»*«/, S^tff" 977-3*** 
(Notice  Address) (Phone) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
Q<Acceptance ol Oder lo Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing oiler on the terms and conditions specified above 
X UOC^UM/X aHt»r,.93 . 
'(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
D Refection: Seller Refects the foregoing offer (Seller's Initials) i_i(Date) (Time) 
D Counter Often Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified In the attached 
Counter Offer ff 
Page 2 of 2 pages Seller's Initials ( ) Date Buyer's Initials ( ) Date 
ADDv^OUM tf 1 /COUNTER OFFER tf JN 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This Is an ADDENDUM/OOUMTCn OFTER to thai REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (Ihe "REPC") wllh an Offer Reference Date 
of December 1 7 — _ , 19 _33 .Including aft addenda and counter offers, 
between Salt Lake Coupi^Lr-^u-body--corpoya4e and po l i t i c of thp State of Utah ,asBuyer, 
and —Int.prmnuntaln Milk PrnHurers Association as Seller 
The lollowing terms are hereby Incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict wllh any provisions of Ihe 
REPC, these terms shall conlrot All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
— L — T h i s offer Is subject to.BuyeEJs—satisfaction of atuenv1rnnmpnt.nl audit to be peEtormed 
at Buyer's expense. Sell.er will provide Buyer with copies of any environmental audits 
or reports already In Seller's possession, Including reports on removal of underground 
tanks and hazardous materia] spills. 
2. Seller will provide Buver with any studies, surveys, or Information pertinent to the 
property now 1n seller's possession. 
.33 T M c nffpr u gnhjprh tn Rnypr's approval of an appraisal of value to be obtained at 
Buyer's expense. 
4t ThU nffpr U subject to final approval by the Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners. 
5. Buyer and Seller will split on a 50% - 50% basis those closing costs normally shared 
equally by Buyers and Sellers or real property. 
—£- Any commission paid tn real estate agents will he paid hy Seller. 
Description of property? Approximately 5 acres of vacant land on the Southeast corner of 
Vine Street and Woodoak Land, Murray, Utah, and further described as Sldwell Nos: 
22-17-102-009 containing approximately 1.93 acres, 22-03-354-001 containing approximately 
1.62 acres, and 22-08-354-002 obtaining approximately 1.51 acres. 
M'Seller [ J Buyer shall have until _J£ i??C2_[ ]A.M ( ) ( P . M Mountain Time, . 
b&e- X^f jg^l.to 
these .terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
IsfBuyer [ ) Seller S i g n a t u r e " ~ ^^ / , / D a l e 
accept 
11 Buyer ( ) Seller Signature / ' / » .; 
r>*>, ^ H i , ^ J - % . * * > " • . ,«\A 
Date 
— ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
CHE6KONE- *' '• 
k£/Vcce£tance fjySellerrt] Buyer hereby accepts these terms 
t ] Buyer Mueller Signature Date Time 
IJ Buyer [ ) Seller Signature Date Time 
( I Rejection: t ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects these terms. 
(Initials) l L l _ (Date) (Time) 
[ ] Counter Often ( ) Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer # 
TI us utsajOSUKi: FORM IS INTWDHD rou usr. mr WJM. I^TTAII: uorsra-s 
IK DtSOJOSJNC ACl:»CY KIl^TlONSlUItS) lO Kim* AND SIIJXX 
Winrn yog cntef into a di.vcus.vion with a rval estate agent rvprding a rval estate transaction, you should, from the outMn. understand who 
tin* real estate agent is representing in the transaction. More importantly, you should understand how that agency relationship impacts your 
business relationship with the real estate agent and the Buyer or ScUcr. 
Duties of Seller's Agent 
A real cstaic agent who has Usted a Sellers property for sale acts as the agent for the Seller only and has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the 
Seller. In practical terms, the ScUcr has hired the agent to sell their propeny and that agent should attempt to obtain lor the Seller the most 
favorable sales pnee and terms. Although the Seller's agent has this fiduciary duty to the Seller, that agent is. by law. responsible to all 
prospective buyers to treat them with honesty, fair dealing, and with good fatth. A Seller's agent under a listing agreement with Seller acts 
as the agent for the ScUcr only. A seller's agent or a subagent of that agent has the following affirmative obligations: (To the Seller) A 
fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings with the Seller: (To the Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skills, and diligence in performance of the agent's duues: (b) A duty of honesty and fair dealing with good faith; (c) A duty 
to disclose all fans known to the agent which materially affect the propeny that arc not known to. or within the diligent attention and 
observation of. the panics. 
Duties of Buyer's Agent 
A real estate agent can. with a Buyer's written consent, defining how the agent will be paid, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. As agent 
working on behalf of the Buyer, the agent has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Buyer. In praaical terms, that means the Buyer's agent Is 
concerned with the Buyer's best interests in the transaction, including attempting to obtain for the Buyer the most favorable sales pnee and 
terms. A selling agent can. with a Buyer's consent, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. In these situations, the agent Is not the ScUcrs 
agent, even if by agreement the agent may receive a commission from the SeUcx. An agent acting only for the Buyer has the following 
affirmative oblipuons: (To the Buyer) (a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, lntcgnry, honest}*, and loyalty in dealings with the ScBcn (To the 
Buyer and the ScBcr) (a) A duty to exercise reasonable care skills and diligence in performance of the agent's duties; (b) A dury of honcsry 
and fair dcaUng with good faith: (c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent which matcriaUy affee the value of propeny that arc not 
known to or within the diiigcnt^iicwb^n and oos4rvauon-oi the parties. 
Duties of Agent Representing both Buyer and Seller 
A real estate agent, cither acting directly or though onToTinorg iS!»uclati' himu>m. uuy legally Ur the JggnToTboth the SeBcr and the Buyer 
in a transaction, but only with the knowledge and consent of both the Seller and the Buyer. In a dual agency situation, the agent has the 
foUowing aifinnative obBgaoons to both the SeBer and the Buyer: (a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, lntcgnry. honcsry. and loyalty in 
dealings with the ScBer and the Buyer; (b) Other dubes to the Seller and the Buyer as stated above in their rcspecuve secuons. In representing 
both Seller and Buyer, the agen: may not without the express permission of the respective parry, cusdose to the other parry that the Sciicr 
will accept a price Izss than the listing price or that the Buyer will pay a pnee greater than the pnee offered. 
Duties of Buver and Seller 
Tne above duties of rcaJ estate agents in a real estate transacjon do not relieve a SeBer or a Buyer from the responsibility to cxcrcsc good 
business Judgment in proteczng their respecuve interests. Vou should carefully read ail agreements to assure that they adequately express 
you: understanding of the transaction. If legal or tax advice is desued. consult a competent professional attorney or accountant. 
Confirmation of Agency Disclosure 
A: Lie signing of this agreement, the foUowwg agency rcboonshipCs) is/arc hereby confirmed for the trj 
TIM real estate agcn*rO is the agent of (brcie one whic 
aoioi 
CByv&of 
Ackno wl e dgement 
(Signature of Licensee) 
1/wc acknowledge receipt of 2 copy of this disclosure and confirmation, and understand and agree with the agency relationship confirmed 
herein. 
rt*^*^ \MfiJ~15'gmJUt^ 72+&{<++ 
AGENT Bv 
Date Time AM/PM 
Date Tunc AM/PM 
Date 
n n i ~?n 
ADDENDUM 4 f/CQUNTER OFFER i * 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Uw if «n ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE nniOIASe COtrnUOT (te HIEPC7 with « Oflte ReCo«n<^ 
P«*qf-9. io»mW17 ,19,94 , i n d i c t i d A ^ ^ g * ^ 0*00 U « ^ &0t Lite ( W r . > BoAr Comers A t^ltde of 
ttw&ittofUhli -Amur—1 liiterwtimil Mlllt *tA**t Aurrhthn n <UIW 
TbtfoDov^ tfonttfakft^SmxvpovrtoJM 
1EPC * « • wrax riufl cootroL All otaf tutu* oC ths REFC «* modHwd thafl wmtn &• MOM. 
1. BUYER REMOVES ALL CONTINGENCIES. 
X CLOSE*}1$ EXTENDED TO. ON OR BEFORE APWL2J, 19*4. 
UlSailor t l Bom<h»Uh«v«until 2.-Q0 f l AJ& MP.H MountainTW. • ApnTIS .19 94 .to mxmn th— unrnm 
•eeoTdtnct wWi Seedoa 23 of the REPC Unlou to tcceptod, tfus offer ttmll Upsc 
C) Buyer [ ] Stlfer SiflttfWV 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECnON/COUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
IJAccaptnae ( ] 5tEcr ( ] Bvycr hutby accepts then teas. 
( ] Buytr (3 Seller Slfomfc Of Time 
U Bayw U Seflex SitMtnre 
( J F^eetfom [ ] Sin«r [ ] B07W njtcB; tfi«w tirms. 
_ _ flntttolrt fP«c) 
i t [}Co*taOfta: [ ] ScOcr [J Buyer 
Date 
.(Thnt) 
•ft forth an tfif atacfaitf Coumr Offtr # 
WDCi WESTERN DAIRYMEN COOPERATIVE, INC. 
January 5, 1994 
Charlie Davis 
Consolidated Realty Group 
175 East 400 South, Suite 710 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Charlie: 
Just a brief outline of the two stacks of paper enclosed, so that 
you better understand what has transpired. 
The first stack contains information on the removal of underground 
storage tanks* During that removal, some diesel fuel ran back into 
the excavation from the connecting piping. It was estimated at 
less than five gallons. We kept the hole open and pumped it 
several times into a tanker. The state personnel did not respond 
(physically) to our report, but Kent Minor of the County Health 
Department was on the scene daily. He finally gave the order to 
close the hole. 
The second stack of papers relate to the demolition of the 
buildings on both the East side and West side of Vine Street. 
Certain transformer oil and other possible contaminants were 
disposed of at USPCA. During the demolition, a transformer was 
knocked over that contained PCB's. The contaminated soil was 
carefully over excavated and sent to USPCA for legal disposal. 
State personnel, responding to the spill, saw what they believed 
was underground storage tank piping at this spill and put the 
property on the LUST list. In actuality, the piping they saw was 
underground electrical conduit. Finally the state admitted that 
the property did not belong on the LUST list and removed it. 
Results of the tests run after the clean up on that spill are 
included as is the Health Department's letter placing it under a no 
further action status. 
Please feel free to have county personnel talk to me concerning 
these matters if the paperwork does not fully cover the actions. 
Sincerely, 
/ 
W. *£ynn Cot tre l l 
Vice President of Administration 
WLC/mk 
Enclosures 
if&uB P.O. Box 26427 . <5alt I *WA Pitv ! f TAAWK^AII . fflnn Q77.-5nnn M K E M J L J B p n Q ^ w o n . TK *~~ r v i o n ^ ^ i ^ ,->*->* . * , ****> 
